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INTRODUCTION

The confluence of Federal antitrust law and labor law in
legal challenges to agreements between labor and business and
in diverse unilateral actions by either group calls to mind Shakespeare's triumphant pronouncement, "The law hath yet another
* B.A., Yale University 1962; LL.B., Harvard University 1965. Member of the
New York Bar.
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hold on you."' The proper relationship between these two sets
of laws has for decades been problematical. It is still unsettled
whether an antitrust action arising out of labor-related conduct
should be resolved like any other antitrust case, or whether spe2
cial rules should apply.
This uncertain relationship between antitrust law and labor
law' is particularly disturbing to today's businessman. He must
be continuously wary of the fact that an agreement between a
union and an employer might constitute-much to the employer's legitimate surprise and chagrin-an illegal combination
or conspiracy to restrain commerce. As a result, employers need
guidelines to aid them in assessing the antitrust implications of
labor-related conduct. Specifically, they need guidance on the
precise parameters of the exemption or exception from antitrust
liability that the courts have decreed for certain labor-related
conduct.
This exemption is actually two exemptions. The first, known
as the "statutory exemption," applies only to union conduct.4 In
general, it exempts union acts from the antitrust laws if a union
acts in its self-interest and not in combination with a nonlabor
group.5 The second, the "nonstatutory exemption," applies to
unions acting together with employers or employers' groups, to
employers acting alone, and to employers acting with other employers. 6 Any of these permutations is exempt from the antitrust
laws if, generally, the conduct at issue relates to matters that
must be considered in any collective bargaining forum, the conduct primarily affects the parties who stand in a collective barI W. SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, act IV, scene I, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 526 (H. Craig & D. Bevington eds., rev. ed. 1973).
2 See infra notes 282-297 and accompanying text.
3 One commentator has aptly explained: "[T]he difficulty in applying the antitrust concept to organized labor has been that the two are intrinsically incompatible. The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly
and unabashedly, are designed to limit it." St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the
Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 604 (1976); accord A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 872 (9th ed. 1981) (antitrust law

and labor law are "inherently inconsistent"); see also Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v.

Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 769 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (labor law and antitrust law "do not have identical objectives").
4 See infra notes 112-151 and accompanying text (explaining and commenting
on the "statutory exemption").
5 See, e.g.,
Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d
653, 658-59 (3d Cir. 1985) (most recent explication by Third Circuit of statutory
exemption standards).
6 See infra notes 152-238 and accompanying text (explaining and commenting
on the "nonstatutory exemption").
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gaining relationship to each other, and the conduct is the
product of arm's-length bargaining. 7 In addressing the relationship between Federal antitrust law and labor law, this article will
focus on the antitrust labor exemption from the perspective of
the employer. Special attention will be given to the applicability
of each exemption standard to employers and to the practical effects of these standards upon employers.
The focus of this article should not be construed to mean
that the antitrust labor exemption was conceived for the benefit
of business. On the contrary, it was born to protect labor at a
time when unions still fought for legitimacy and recognition. 8
Moreover, its evolution, both in scope and application, has paralleled public perceptions of labor. Therefore, there has been an
identifiable and tenacious link between the exemption and the
changing fortunes of labor.
Grudgingly, however, the courts, and even labor, have come
to include legitimate business activity within the antitrust labor
exemption. 9 As a result, the exemption has become increasingly
important in employers' assessments of the limits of legitimate
business conduct. Furthermore, it has become a salient factor in
employers' evaluations of the likelihood of legal redress from the
sometimes oppressive power of the unions.
This article, then, will analyze the antitrust labor exemption
from the employer's perspective. It will first trace the exemption's history, since the nascent judicial attempts to define it have
reflected the social and political times of the courts. The article
will then outline the current tests applied and the status of the
exemption. In the process, it will attempt to clarify ambiguous
and confusing language in the leading authorities on the exemption and suggest new formulations for some of these standards.
Finally, the article will consider the antitrust issues and implications arising from several situations confronting business7 See, e.g., Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d
653, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1985).
8 See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
250-51 (1970) (discussion of changing contexts in which exemption was born). See
generally Benetar, ors-LaGuardia:Unintended Stumbling Block to Labor Peace, 57 N.Y.
ST. B.J., July 1985, at 16, 17.
1) Several recent labor antitrust cases, therefore, involved unions and employers
jointly defending against antitrust claims on the ground that they both enjoy the
benefits of the nonstatutory exemption. See, e.g., Berman Enters. v. Local 333,
United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. delied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981); Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 1985-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 91
66,522 (E.D. Cal.).
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men in the context of labor-related activities. Among these are
the following: (1) the proper weight to be given to an initial determination that the conduct does or does not violate labor law in
subsequent analysis of antitrust issues; (2) the legality of "most
favored nations" and "affiliates" clauses in collective bargaining
agreements; (3) whether special rules should protect businessmen whose conduct is the result of union pressure and coercion;
and (4) the appropriate antitrust standard-either the rule of reason or aper se analysis-for labor-related antitrust actions. In reviewing the antitrust implications of these labor-based issues for
employers, this article will suggest ways to accomodate and balance the competing policies of labor law and antitrust law.
II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION

Justice Holmes once cautioned that "[w]e do not realize how
large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight
change in the habit of the public mind."' The creation and the
development of the antitrust labor exemption has mirrored this
phenomenon.
A.

Labor in the Pre-Antitrust Years

With the rise of industrialization in the early nineteenth century, workers began to join together and organize into what is
generally regarded as the seed of the American labor union."
Initial judicial reaction to this early labor activity was unremittingly hostile; joint activities by workers were successfully prosecuted as criminal conspiracies, 12 and courts held that conduct as
basic as a joint effort to raise wages was a misdemeanor. '3 In
1842, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
made the first significant inroad into that restrictive attitude
when it upheld the right of workers to organize, though cautioning that "[t]he legality of such association will. . .depend upon
I0 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
' 1 F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 20-21 (3d ed. 1966). For an excellent summary
of the early development of labor unions, see Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy:
Drawing a Line of Demarcation. 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1983).

12 F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 29-31, 64-65; see Comment, Consolidated Express: Antitrust Liability for Illegal Labor Activities, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 649 n.29
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Consolidated Express].
1' See, e.g., People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (organization of
journeymen bootmakers in Geneva, New York seeking higher wages). Leading social critics such as William Cullen Bryant condemned the decision as tantamount to
slavery. F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 65; see I. WERSTEIN, T1HE GREAT STRUGGL.E:
LABOR IN AMERICA 36-37 (1965).
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The New Antitrust Laws

During the next half century, new developments on the antitrust and labor fronts developed concomitantly with the rise of
monopolies and predatory capitalism. In 1890, Congress passed
the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 5 As for labor, its most cogent inroad
on the new industrial behemoth was the creation of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1881.16 Although aimed at a common enemy in monopoly capitalism, these antitrust and labor developments were initially antithetical to a public that was high on
the American ideal of free enterprise. 7 It did not take long,
therefore, for a court to apply the new antitrust legislation
against the new unions. In United States v. Debs,' 8 where union
leader Eugene V. Debs was convicted of contempt for violating
an injunction against the now famous 1894 Pullman strike in Chicago,' 9 the circuit court reasoned:
14 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 134 (1842) (agreement of
Journeymen Bootmakers Society of Boston not to work for anyone employing journeyman who was not member of Society); see also T. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE 2122 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing Hunt case); N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR
SECTOR 126-27 (2d ed. 1971) (same); F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 65-66 (same);J.
RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 91-92 (expanded ed. 1966) (same).
15 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)); see also Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,522, at 65,592 (E.D. Cal.) (succinct explication of Sherman Act's early construction in cases containing a labor context).
16 See L. TODD & M. CURTI, RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION 501-02 (3d ed. 1972)
(good discussion of how the AFL emerged from the disunity of nascent unions in
the decades immediately after the Civil War). See generally F. DULLES, supra note 11,
at 150-65.
17

M.

MELTZER,

BREAD AND ROSES: THE STRUGGLE OF AMERICAN LABOR,

1865-

1915, at 50-74, 124-33 (1967). The attitude of the courts toward the working class
is well-illustrated by the following passage from an opinion of Justice Stephen J.
Field:
The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his
own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in
what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment
upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be
disposed to employ him.
Butchers Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City LiveStock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field,J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law, 23 U.
CHI. L. REV. 221, 229-32 (1956). But see L. LITWACK, TH1E AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 3-4 (1962) (American work force oppressed by industrialization).
's 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), affd sub nom. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
,. While the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the union officials, it did
so on nonantitrust grounds and declined to rule on the applicability of the antitrust
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That the original design [of the Sherman Act was] to suppress
trusts and monopolies. . .is clear; but it is equally clear that a
further and more comprehensive purpose came to be entertained, and was embodied in the final form of the enactment.
Combinations are condemned, not only when they take the
form of trusts, but in whatever form found, if they be in re20
straint of trade.

Thus, organized labor rapidly became a "combination" as undesirable and illegal as the predatory corporate monopolies.

Debs was, in some ways, a foreseeable and logical outgrowth of
the public fear of organized labor. The violent strikes of the 1880's
and 1890's, such as the Haymarket Riot and the Homestead Strike,
severely frightened the nation. 2 ' Moreover, labor had begun to act

as a political force and to clamor for recognition in political elections. Although those efforts were relatively unsuccessful, to the

public they signaled an era of labor strife and a determined campaign by organized labor to reverse the courts' restraints on the
growth of labor power.2 2
In 1908, judicial expression of this public opinion culminated in
laws to labor. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895); see also United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893) (injunction issued
against strike).
20 Debs, 64 F. at 747; see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531-35 (1983) (discussing common law origins of antitrust law); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) (discussing the rule of reason); Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (noting that not all agreements restraining trade
are illegal); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (rule of reason
should be applied to determine whether agreement violates Sherman Act). See generallyJ. RAYBACK, supra note 14, at 206 (discussing the Debs case).
21 SeeJ. RAYBACK, supra note 14, at 194-207; L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra note 16,
at 503; see also A. PARADiS, LABOR IN ACTION 35-36, 46-49 (rev. ed. 1975) (describing Haymarket Riot).
22 See Jacobs, The Wandering Labor Exemption Under Antitrust Law, 15 J. MAR. L.
REV. 591, 592-93 (1982). The link between these bold steps and the antitrust problem they engendered is well-explained in the work by Dulles:
A first step in trying to exercise more effective political pressure in support of such aims was made in 1906 when the A.F. of L. submitted a Bill
of Grievances to the President and to Congress. It included most of the
traditional demands that labor had been voicing since the Civil
War. .

.

. Most important, however, were demands for exemption of

labor unions from the Sherman Act and relief from injunctions which
were said to represent a judicial usurpation of power properly belonging to the legislature.
F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 199; see also L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra note 16, at 50306 (discussion of public mood toward organized labor in last two decades of nineteenth century).
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the Danbury Hatters' case. 2 3 There, the United States Supreme
Court definitively applied the Sherman Act and barred organizing
and other labor activities by the United Hatters of North America as
an illegal "combination 'in restraint of trade.' "24 As in Debs, organized labor became the victim of the Federal antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, the public climate was clearly changing. 25 In its
nascent stage, these new attitudes produced the Clayton Antitrust
Act.2 6 Widely dubbed "the 'Magna Charta' of labor,"-2 7 section 6 of
the Act expressly exempted labor unions from the antitrust laws,2 8
and section 20 prohibited the issuance of injunctions in any Federal
case between employers and employees "concerning terms or conditions of employment," except to prevent "irreparable injury" to
property and property rights. 29 These provisions seemed clear
enough on their face.
The courts, however, were still not ready to listen. In its 1921
23 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).

See generallyJ. RAYBACK, supra note 14,

at 223-24.
24 Loewe, 208 U.S. at 292; see id. at 304.
25 G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 11 (1958). Mowry states: "Labor appeared to be on the march in the new century in both the political and economic arenas. And public opinion, at least in some urban districts, instead of
condemning its activities as it had in the early nineties, seemed to support it." Id.;
accord L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra note 16, at 560.
26 Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1982) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982)).
27 LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORICAL RECORD OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 314 (. Smith & P. Murphy eds. 1958); T. BROOKS, supra note 14, at
107.
28 Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 6, 38
Stat. 730, 731 (1914)). This section reads as follows:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor. .. organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
2) Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). This section reads in part:
[N]o. . .restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation or employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to
do. . .nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered
or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
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decision in Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering,3" the Supreme Court
continued to give legitimacy to broad injunctions against organized
labor activity.3" Given the prosperity of the 1920's, this re-endorsement of business's free hand in America's economy was not surprising. Once again, the Supreme Court chose not to disrupt an
economic system that was, to the public eye, working. With the
American economy experiencing unprecedented prosperity, the organized labor movement was decidedly in retreat and on the
defensive.3 2
C.

The New Deal Labor Legislation

It was not until another decade had passed and the country
had weathered the racking suffering of the Depression that a
change in political and judicial thinking permitted labor unions
to gain recognition and meaningful rights under the law.33
Under the New Deal, broad new labor laws were passed, including legislation specifically aimed at taking legitimate union conduct out of the antitrust laws. The National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act 3 4 legalized unions and mandated that employers
bargain with them. It labeled coercive acts by employers "unfair
labor practices" and subjected such employers to sanction by the
newly created National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 5 In the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 36 Congress expressly prohibited the Federal courts from enjoining several specified acts in the context of
30

254 U.S. 443 (1921).

31 See Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 465, 478-79 (secondary boycott enjoined as

violation of Sherman Act); see also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 42-43, 55 (1927) (union rule forbidding work at nonunion locations held illegal); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344, 408-09 (1922) (antitrust laws prohibit strike seeking to bar nonunion products). See generally Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,522, at 65,592 (E.D. Cal.); G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR
RELATIONS 638-39 (9th ed. 1981); N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, supra note 14, at
127-29.
32 See generally L. BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER 203-10 (1984). In the fifteen years preceding 1933, union membership fell to less than 3 million, lower than
the figure at the outbreak of World War I. F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 261.
33 See generally A. PARADIS, supra note 21, at 82-83; L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra
note 16, at 662, 691.
34 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166
(1982)).
35' See id. §§ 3, 8, 10, 49 Stat. at 451-53 (current versions at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153,
158, 160 (1982)). See generally NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 282-86 (1965); N.
CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, supra note 14, at 132-34.
36 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-1 15
(1982)).
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labor disputes. 7 Congress made its purpose clear; the Senate
Report on the bill explained that "It]he primary object of the
proposed legislation is to protect labor in the lawful and effective
exercise of its conceded rights-to protect, first, the right of free
association and, second, the right to advance the lawful object of
38

association.
These new statutes sparked an outburst of union organizing
activity and concomitant industrial strife.3 9 At the forefront of
this activity was the Committee for Industrial Organization of
John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman, which later became the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).' ° As the decade of the
1930's wore on, the CIO came to be recognized as the radical
and partisan voice of the working poor.4 Violence followed, as
both management and labor armed and confronted each other in
37 See id. §§ 4-9, 47 Stat. at 70-72 (current versions at 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-109
(1982)). Section 2 expressed the overriding public policy of the Act:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid
of governmental authority for owners of property to organize the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be
free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection ...
Id. § 2, 47 Stat. at 70 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982)). The historical
and social backdrop of the Act was well-summarized in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union
Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91, 102 (1940). See also LK Productions, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 1979-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,871, at 79,058-60 (S.D. Tex.) (discussing the Milk Wagon Drivers' case).
38 S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1932). One leading labor historian
has observed that "[r]epeated public opinion polls revealed strong support for each
of the successive labor measures adopted by Congress between 1933 and 1938." F.
DULLES, supra note 11, at 286.
39 Between 1930 and 1940, union membership rose from approximately 3.5 million workers (7% of the labor force) to approximately 9 million workers (16% of
the labor force). L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra note 16, at 701. In the process, new
forms of labor revolt such as the "sitdown strike" and internecine struggle such as
the "jurisdictional strike" were spawned. Id. at 700-01.
40 A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL 413-19 (1958). The CIO was
the unskilled workingman's answer to the AFL, which had largely ignored the noncraft worker. See id. at 407-12. By 1940, the CIO had 4 million members of its own.
L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra note 16, at 700.
41 See J. RAYBACK, supra note 14, at 362-69; see also J. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: T1E
LION AND THE Fox 350-51 (1956) (discussing the radical politics of the CIO); A.
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outright war. 4 2 In a series of ensuing legal battles, the courts literally revolutionized labor-antitrust law and laid the foundation
of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws.
D.

The Statutory Exemption

A watershed in this revolution was the Supreme Court's
1940 decision in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.43 In Apex, the Court

refused to enjoin a violent sit-down strike by workers seeking to
establish a union shop. 4 4 In so doing, the Court expressly acknowledged that the result would have been different under preNew Deal law. 45 The following year, in United States v. Hutcheson, 4 1 the Court dismissed a Government prosecution of union
officials. 4 7 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, took the
opportunity to revitalize sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and
to immortalize the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 4 8 In the
supra note 21, at 99-100 (same); I. WERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 168-70
(same).
42 See generally F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 288-311.
43 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
44 Id. at 501-02, 512-13.
45 See id. at 504 n.24, 505. Apex succinctly but earthshakingly balanced the competing policies:
[S]uccessful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage
agreement with employers, may have some influence on price competition by eliminating that part of such competition which is based on differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a labor
combination effective it must eliminate the competition from non-union
made goods. . .an elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the
kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted). For some authorities, this case remains a part of
"the bedrock of labor-antitrust principles." Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining
and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459,
483 (1981); see also G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 31, at 645 (Apex was a
landmark case); cf. Winter, Collective Bargainingand Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 43 (1963) (criticizing the Apex decision as "a fundamental error," but noting that it remains "of abiding
importance. . .to practicing lawyers").
46 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
47 See id. at 228, 237.
48 Id. at 233-34. Another important case of this era was Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union Local 753 v.Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91 (1940). Though eclipsed
in legal history by Hutcheson, Milk Wagon Drivers' contains one of the Supreme
Court's most explicit condemnations of the use of injunctions in labor
controversies:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932, is the culmination of a bitter
political, social and economic controversy extending over halfa century.
Hostility to "government by injunction" had become the rallying slogan
PARADIS,
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process, the Court expressly criticized the previous "unduly restrictive judicial construction" of those statutes.4 ' The Court's
statement in Hutcheson of what has come to be known as "the statutory exemption" remains the principal test of that facet of the
labor exemption to this day:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with nonlabor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20
are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness
or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.5 °
Because Hutcheson involved conduct of only labor groups themselves, the Supreme Court left open for future resolution what the
rule would be for joint conduct of labor and nonlabor groups.
The forum for the resolution of this question arose four years
after Hutcheson. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, InternationalBrotherhood
of Electrical Workers 5 and Hunt v. Crumboch,52 the Supreme Court
faced the first of a series of several "nonstatutory exemption" situations that it would confront.5 3 Allen Bradley presented perhaps the
paradigm labor-nonlabor conspiracy. A group of New York City
of many and varied groups ....
[T]he Congress made abundantly clear
their intention that what they regarded as the misinterpretation of the
Clayton Act should not be repeated in the construction of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. For us to hold, in the face of this legislation, that the
federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases growing out
of labor disputes, merely because alleged violations of the Sherman Act
are involved, would run counter to the plain mandate of the Act and
would reverse the declared purpose of Congress.
Id. at 102-03.
49 Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 236. As this statement suggests, the labor exemption
runs counter to the general rule that antitrust exemptions are to be narrowly and
strictly construed. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
231 (1979); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see also Pan
Alaska Trucking v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,789, at 63,896 (D. Alaska) (recognition of this rule in labor-related antitrust
case).
50 Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232 (footnote omitted); see H.A. Artists & Assocs. v.
Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 717-21 (1981); American Fed'n of Musicians v.
Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 105-08 (1968); Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. William Morris
Agency, 411 F. Supp. 403, 407 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
51 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
52 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
53 Some commentators criticize these designations-"statutory exemption" and
"nonstatutory exemption"-as inaccurate and misleading. See, e.g., King & Moser,
Muko and Conex: The Third Circuit Responds to Connell, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 79, 84
n.31 (1980). Nevertheless, they have gained recognition as the easiest frames of
reference by which to distinguish the appropriate rules for purely labor as opposed
to joint labor-businessman conduct.
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electrical contractors had agreed to purchase equipment only from
unionized manufacturers in return for two promises: the manufacturers' promise to sell only to those contractors, and the union's
promise to enforce that arrangement by boycotting or striking dissidents.5 4 The Supreme Court held that, since the arrangement included understandings about market division and price-fixing, it was
not within the antitrust labor exemption and thus violated the antitrust laws.5 5
More startling on its facts was Hunt. There, the union sought
retaliation against Hunt after one of its members was murdered in a
violent strike.5 6 The catalyst for this retaliation was the indictment
and subsequent acquittal of one of Hunt's partners for the murder.5 7 The union launched a determined effort to put Hunt's company out of business by compelling its hauling customers to sign
union shop contracts, while simultaneously refusing to negotiate a
collective bargaining agreement with Hunt.5" Thereafter, the union
forced Hunt's suppliers to cancel their business with Hunt on the
ground that it was a nonunion shop.5 9 Subsequently, Hunt sought
an injunction against the union's activity.6" The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in favor of the union.6 It reasoned that the only
issue was unilateral conduct of union members, which was necessarily outside the purview of the antitrust laws under
both the statutory
62
exemption and the antitrust laws themselves.
E.

Congress's Effort to Redress the Balance

The post-World War II years saw a change in the balance of
power between management and unions, with labor gaining in54 Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 799-800.
55 Id. at 809-10; see also Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,and the Antitrust
Laws, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 659, 670-78 (1965) (discussing Allen Bradley); Sovern, Some
Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 LAB. L.J. 957, 960-63
(1962) (same); Winter, supra note 45, at 45-51 (same). See generallV Bernhardt, The
Allen Bradley Doctrine:An Accomodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1094

(1962).
5(6 Hunt, 325 U.S. at 822-23.
57 Id. at 822.

58 Id. at 822-23.
5,) Id. at 823.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 823, 826.
(2 Id. at 824. The Court stated that "[t]he only combination here...was one of
workers alone and what they refused to sell petitioner was their labor." Id.; see also
H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 709 (1981) (regulations propounded by actors' union were within the statutory antitrust labor
exemption).
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creasing power. A wave of disrupting strikes brought sympathy
to employers and cries for new legislation to bring the pendulum
5
back into equilibrium.6 4 The result was the Taft-Hartley Act' of
1947, which reasserted basic rights of employers and amended
section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act to redress "unfair
labor practices" by unions.6 6 Essentially, the Taft-Hartley Act
declared that a union committed an unfair labor practice if it 6did
7
what the Wagner Act had prohibited employers from doing.
In the 1950's, public revelation of labor corruption and racketeering occurred in muckraking exposes and Congressional
hearings. 68 Coupled with an increase in so-called "blackmail
picketing" 6 9 and secondary boycotts, these black marks on the
labor movement led to the Labor-Management Reporting and
63 During the World War II years, union membership increased by almost 50%;
by mid-1945, nearly 14 million workers were union members. See F. DULLES, supra
note 11, at 335; L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra note 16, at 701. This new power
brought with it a concern over the power and abuses of "big labor":
The feeling was widespread that in self-centered defense of its own interests, organized labor was totally ignoring those of the people as a
whole. This latent hostility was fanned by reactionary, anti-labor forces

within the business community. .

.

. Repeated public opinion polls

showed that the nation was deeply concerned over the militancy of labor's rank-and-file and the seeming lack of responsibility of its leaders.
F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 355.
64 F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 353-56; see N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, supra
note 14, at 144-46; I. WERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 171. In many ways, the American
economic history mirrors that of Great Britain one generation earlier. Thus, it is
noteworthy that Keynes himself wrote in 1926 that British "trade unions, once the
oppressed, have now become tyrants." A. HANSEN, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 158
n.5 (1957).
65 Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187
(1982)). See generally St. Antoine, Secondary Boycott: From Antitrust to Labor Relations,
40 ANTITRUST L.J. 242, 246-52 (1971) (discussing the Taft-Hartley Act).
66 Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (amending National
Labor Relations Act § 8) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982)).
67 See id. Senator Robert Taft, co-draftsman of the bill, explained its purpose in a
radio speech on May 13, 1947: "[O]ur aim should be to reach the point where,
when an employer meets with his employees, they have substantially equal bargaining power, so that neither side feels it can make an unreasonable demand and get
away with it." W. WHITE, THE TAFT STORY 75 (1954). In his speech, Senator Taft
drew direct parallels to the Wagner Act and lamented about the imbalance of
power that it had given rise to in the war years: "The Wagner Act was enacted for a
proper purpose but the result of the actual administration of that act has been completely one-sided." Id. at 76.
68 J. RAYBACK, supra note 14, at 433-35.
69 "Blackmail picketing" is coercive picketing designed to pressure nonunion
workers to join the union and to force employers to accede to the organizing aims
of the union. See Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1099 (1960).
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Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act 70 in 1959. This statute tightened the Taft-Hartley Act's proscriptions and created new protections against labor abuses.7 ' More specifically, it amended
section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act 72 and created a private right
of action designed to redress the types of coercive practices that
had been exempted from the antitrust laws in Hunt and its progeny. 73 In addition to these restraints on unbridled union con70 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-166, 401-531 (1982)). "Hot cargo" provisions, whereby unions sought to
force an employer to require union members to refuse to perform services for
other employers designated by the union as untouchables, were a principal focus of
the new legislation. See generally Cox, The Landrum-Grijfin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 270-74 (1959); Greenberg, Secondary Activity and the Labor Antitrust Exemption: An HistoricalPresentation,47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1301,
1306 (1979).
71 See generally Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751
F.2d 653, 660 (3d Cir. 1985); L. TODD & M. CURT], supra note 16, at 760-61. Todd
and Curti summarize the Landrum-Griffin Act as follows:

It prohibited Communists or persons convicted of felonies . . . from

serving as union officials or employees. (2) It prohibited secondary boycotts and the picketing of parties other than those directly involved in a
strike. (3) It required labor unions to file annual financial reports ...
(6) It provided a "bill of rights" guaranteeing union members the right
to attend meetings, nominate candidates for political office, and vote in
elections using secret ballots.
Id.
72 Ch. 120, § 303, 61 Stat. 136, 158 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1982)).
73 See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(e), 73 Stat. 519, 545
(1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982)). SeegenerallvJames Julian, Inc.
v. Raytheon Co., 499 F. Supp. 949 (D. Del. 1980). The Julian court stated:
Section 303 permits damage actions against labor organizations which
engage in conduct violative of section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). Section 8(b)(4) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization, inter alia, to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where . . . an object thereof is-

(A) forcing or requiring an employer. . .to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by [section 8(e)];
(B) forcing or requiring any person. . .to cease doing business
with any other person ...
Id. at 958-59.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the amended § 8(b)(4) was intended
to prohibit secondary objectives such as the exertion of pressure on a neutral employer. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 638-39 (1967).
The Court has also recognized that activity directed against the primary employer is
permissible under this section. Id.
Recent authority has suggested that § 303, whose rules of construction and
criteria are different from those of the antitrust laws, provides an exclusive, rather
than a cumulative, remedy for coercive union conduct. See Comment, Connell Five
Years After: Labor's Antitrust Exemption and the Scope of the Construction Industry Proviso to
Section 8(e), 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 799, 814-15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
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duct, the Landrum-Griffin Act reaffirmed the obligation of
employers and unions to bargain over wages, hours, and working
conditions.
F.

The Nonstatutory Exemption

With the growth of labor and the notion of bargaining, the
stage was set for a test of labor's antitrust exemption in the context of the collective bargaining process itself.75 The focus of the
labor exemption cases had shifted, as had the labor movement's
struggles, from organizing at the factory gate and battling on the
picket line to negotiating at the bargaining table.76 Labor's adversary had also changed from the recalcitrant single employer to
the multi-employer bargaining association.77 It was against this
historical backdrop that the Supreme Court in 1965 rendered its
next important round of decisions.7 8
The first of these decisions was United Mine Workers v. Pennington.79 At issue was the legality of a clause in the National Bitu-

minous Coal Wage Agreement executed by the United Mine
Workers and the larger coal concerns in the industry, which had
the effect of imposing higher wage scales on smaller compaFive Years]; see also Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ., 715 F.2d 21, 28 (2d
Cir. 1983) (injured plaintiff may not recover damages for the same acts under two
different theories); Allied Int'l Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640
F.2d 1368, 1381 (1st Cir. 1981) (liability under 29 U.S.C. § 187 is alternative to
antitrust liability); C & K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 1982-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
64,830, at 72,136-37 (W.D. Pa.) (recovery of damages under labor law
precludes recovery under antitrust law).
74 See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704, 73 Stat. 519, 542 (1959)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982)). See generally G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP,
supra note 31, at 652-54, 719.
75 Casey & Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: The Problemsof Connell and a Remedy that Follows Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 242.
76 See generally T. BRooKs, supra note 14, at 277-79;J. RAYBACK, supra note 14, at
440-61. There are, of course, exceptions to every rule. See, e.g., Amalgamated
Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (union charged company with harassment of and discrimination
against union workers in violation of antitrust laws), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d
Cir. 1980).
77 See infra note 151. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the changes
in the nature of the labor movement. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1970).
78 Jacobs, supra note 22, at 603. In the interim, the Court made no departure
from the Allen Bradley and Hunt tests. See, e.g., Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 100-02 (1962); Marine Cooks & Stewards
v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 n.7 (1960); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959).
79 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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nies. ° The wage scales made it impossible for them to compete
against the larger companies. 8 ' The Supreme Court found the
clause subject to the antitrust laws. 8" The Court stated:
We have said that a union may make wage agreements
with a multi-employer bargaining unit and may in pursuance
of its own union interests seek to obtain the same terms from
other employers. No case under the antitrust laws could be
made out on evidence limited to such union behavior. But we
think a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws
when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining
units. One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate
competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the
employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. This is true
even though the union's part in the scheme is an undertaking
to secure the same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the remaining employers in the industry.8 3
Thus, Pennington launched a continuing controversy over the permissible reach of the agreements between multi-employer associations and unions that have become standard throughout this
country.8 4
Simultaneously, in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co. ,85 the Supreme Court held that a clause restricting the hours
during which Chicago butchers could operate their businesses,
although not entitled to protection under the statutory exemption,
was exempt from the antitrust laws under a nonstatutory exemp80 See id. at 659-60.
81 Id. at 660.

82

Id. at 669.

Id. at 665-66 (footnote omitted); accord Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401
U.S. 302, 313 (1971). The Supreme Court in Pennington went on to express some
reservations about the right of unions to seek industry-wide agreements:
This Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor
organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on
differences in such standards ....
But there is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the union and the employers in one bargaining unit
83

are free to bargain about the wages, hours and working conditions of
other bargaining units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire
industry. On the contrary, the duty to bargain unit by unit leads to a
quite different conclusion.
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666. See generally G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 31, at

646.
84

This issue-the proper reach of a multi-employer/union contract-has been

the subject of much of the continuing controversy surrounding the antitrust labor
exemption for the past 20 years. See generally infa notes 239-251.
85

381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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tion.8" In so doing, Mr. Justice White decreed the basic test of the
nonstatutory exemption, which endured for the next two decades:
Employers and unions are required [under labor law] to bargain about wages, hours and working conditions, and this fact
weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements
on these subjects. But neither party need bargain about other
matters and either party commits an unfair labor practice if it
conditions its bargaining upon discussions of a nonmandatory subject ...
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours
restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related
to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful
attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide arm's-length
bargainingin pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the

behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within
the protection of the national labor policy and is 8therefore
ex7
empt from the Sherman Act. We think that it is.
The Court's emphasis upon and indeed reversion to the dictates of labor law was understandable given the make-up of the
Court and, more significantly, the legislative events of the prior fifty
years. Four important labor relations statutes had been enacted by
Congress in the previous thirty years. No antitrust statute had been
passed in fifty years, and the last antitrust statute itself had evinced a
clear intent to exclude legitimate labor conduct from the antitrust
laws. Congress had made another message loud and clear in the
86 See id. at 688, 691 (White, J., plurality opinion). There is no majority opinion
in Jewel Tea, but most authorities look to the opinion of Mr. Justice White and two
of his colleagues as the authoritative statement of the law. See, e.g., Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930,
935 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see also Cox, Labor and The Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REV. 317, 328 (1967) (advocating
broad acceptance ofJustice Goldberg's concurring opinion); Case Comment, Establishing an Objective Intent Standardfor the Labor Antitrust Exemption: Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Associates, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1280-84
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, An Objective Standard] (acknowledging acceptance ofJustice White's opinion, but criticizing it for vagueness and inconsistency).
87 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90 (White, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). As noted earlier, the requirement that employers and unions
bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" is
contained in the Landrum-Griffin Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg advocated that those so-called "mandatory subjects of [collective] bargaining" should always be exempt from the antitrust laws,
rather than only conditionally exempt, as Mr. Justice White had held. See Jewel Tea,
381 U.S. at 711-12 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The courts sinceJewel Tea, however,
have declined to go that far. See, e.g., Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 523-24 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).

1986]

ANTITRUST LABOR EXEMPTION

Landrum-Griffin Act barely six years earlier: certain subjectswages, hours, and working conditions-must be negotiated over the
bargaining table. The Supreme Court understandably and rightly
took a further cue from that legislation.
It soon became clear, however, that determining precisely what
was "intimately related" to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining was not an easy task. Almost anything a union talks about
will have some relation to wages, hours, and working conditions.
Therefore, both the antitrust exemption's applicability to the collective bargaining situation and the legality of the contracts resulting
from such bargaining came to depend on the degree of relation between labor's conduct and agreements and the sanctioned subjects
of wages, hours, and working conditions.
In many respects, therefore, Jewel Tea raised more questions
than it answered. For example, when does a legitimate collective
bargaining agreement cross into the realm of a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade? When, if ever, do a union's efforts to
achieve uniform conditions become monopolization? When, if ever,
does a union go too far in seeking to coerce recalcitrant employers
into agreements concerning the sanctioned subjects?"'
These new questions would be answered not in the context of
violent street fighting or strikes designed to organize and gain recognition. Rather, the answers would originate in the carpeted offices of national unions with hundreds of thousands of members,
dues-filled coffers, and powerful control over the work forces in
their industries. In addition, these were issues that reflected new
realities about labor-management relations. The AFL and the CIO
had merged. 9 A brief but important period of labor unity under
the leadership of George Meany and a new generation of collegeeducated lieutenants and local leaders was underway. Labor's attentions were now on complex issues such as inflation, automation,
computerization, the employer's multi-state or international affiliates, job security, and leisure time. '°
88 See generally DiCola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington,Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 705, 725 (1972); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History,

40

ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 239 (1971).
89 See F. DULLES, supra note 11, at 365-76 for a discussion of how and why the
merger came about.
90 Labor itself recognized the new context of its struggle with management.
Thus, the president of a local of the Amalgamated Lithographers of America criticized union leadership in 1966:
With automation the key labor issue of our times, the AFL-CIO does
little more than go through the traditional ritualistic ceremony of passing resolutions. It sits numbly at the center, while the new technology
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In spite of these changes in the labor movement, the next major
Supreme Court statement on the antitrust implications of labor-related conduct was not to come for another ten years. ' In the interim, the lower courts strained to apply the Jewel Tea test in
increasingly complicated fact situations.9 2 Supreme Court decisions
in this period were uneventful, essentially reaffirming the Court's
prior tests regarding both the statutory and the nonstatutory
exemptions .93

G.

The Exemptions in Current Times

In 1975, the Supreme Court made its next important statement of the law regarding the nonstatutory exemption. In Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,9 4 the Court
confronted an increasing trend toward "most favored nations"
clauses 9 5 and ever-broadening union shop requirements in collective bargaining agreements.9 6 A construction union in Dallas,
Texas had imposed a clause upon a multi-employer bargaining
association requiring general contractors to subcontract "work
only to firms that [were] parties to an executed, current collective
bargaining agreement with [the union]." 9 7 One employer, Connell, at first refused to sign the agreement.9 8 Then, when the
remakes the world ....

It allows the public to believe that present-day

workingmen resemble the mechanics of a century and more ago in England, who used to riot against new machinery. Poll the public and you
will surely find it is convinced that labor is trying to hold back the future.
Swayduck, The Greeks Had a Word For It, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1966, at 29, col. 5. The
era of unity, moreover, was rapidly fading as internal leadership strife and flattening membership began to bog down the AFL-CIO. SeeJ. RAYBACK, supra note 14, at
448-51, 455.
91 See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973); Intercontinental
Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 888 (2d Cir.
1970); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union Local
680, 308 F. Supp. 982, 986-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
93 See, e.g., Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971); American
Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
94 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
95 Id. at 619. A "most favored nations" clause requires the union to extend to
employers the most favorable terms of any contract that the union subsequently
enters into with another employer. St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 610.
96 A good example is the "affiliates clause" construed in Berman Enters. v.Local
333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). See id. at 933 n.4, 936; see also i'fra notes 203-222 and
accompanying text (discussing the Berman Enterprises case).
97 Connell, 421 U.S. at 620; see id. at 618-19.
98 Id. at 620.
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union struck it, Connell relented and signed under protest. 99
Connell then sued the union under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.'
The Supreme Court, reversing both lower courts,
held that as a result of the subcontract clause, the union was not
protected from antitrust liability under either the statutory or
nonstatutory exemption:
[L]abor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business
competition based on differences in wages and working conditions. .

.

. Labor policy clearly does not require, however,

that a union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who employ its members. Thus, while
the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some restraints by acting unilaterally.

. . the

nonstatutory exemption

offers no similar protection when a union and a nonlabor party
agree to restrain competition in a business market.' 1
Subsequent authorities'0 2 fastened upon the following passage in
Connell as the applicable test in analyzing the potential antitrust
ramifications of joint union-employer activity:
[T]he methods the union chose are not immune from antitrust
sanctions merely because the goal is legal. .

.

. This kind of

direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that would not
follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and
working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree
not justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore can03
not claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws.
This language itself invited confusion and controversy, and as
will be detailed in the next section of this article, that is precisely
what has "followed naturally" from it.'0 4 In addition, Connell engen99 Id.
100 Id. at 620-21.
1)l Id. at 622-23 (citations omitted). The Court also found that the "most fa-

vored nations" clause was illegal, since it "promised to eliminate competition" by
guaranteeing that no union agreement "would give an unaffiliated contractor a
competitive advantage over members of the [multi-employer bargaining] Association." Id. at 623.
102 See, e.g., Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793,
801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75, at
252-56.
103 Connell, 421 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added).
104 See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines:An Unprecedented Supreme Court
Term-1977, 32 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 530, 574-78 (1977); G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 31, at 647-48. Compare Mackey v. National Football League, 543
F.2d 606, 613-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (agreements between professional football players
and their teams did not qualify for nonstatutory exemption from antitrust laws),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) with Feather v. United Mine Workers, 711 F.2d

24
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dered controversy over the extent to which the contract clauses and
the conduct at issue there were legal or illegal under Federal labor
law. ' 5 This problem will also be discussed below.
In the decade after Connell, the Supreme Court decided two
other labor exemption cases.' 0 6 Neither, however, established a different standard for either the statutory or the nonstatutory exemption. This recent lull in high Court litigation over the labor
exemption may be reflective of the social and economic events of
our times. Unions today are suffering a backlash, which many feel
they have brought upon themselves.'0 7 Union membership has declined.'0 8 Moreover, unions have grudgingly agreed to wage and
other give-backs or to freezes in an effort to stem the collapse of
American manufacturing and production industries and the consequent loss of jobs.'0 9 This climate, for which the unions and their
own aggressive contracts of the 1960's and 1970's must share the
blame, has not been conducive to the kinds of controversial contract
clauses that sparked disputes such as Connell.' 10
530, 535-37, 541-43 (3d Cir. 1983) (mine workers' union activities fell within nonstatutory exemption, but union was subject to liability under Federal labor law).
105 See, e.g., Utilities Servs. Eng'g, Inc. v. Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 549 F.2d 173, 178 (10th Cir. 1977); Steinberg, Application of the Antitrust and
Labor Exemptions to Collective Bargaining of the Reserve System in Professional Baseball, 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1301, 1339-44 (1982).
106 Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519 (1983); H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704
(1981); see also Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40
(1978) (collective bargaining agreement between dockworkers' union and employers not exempt from filing requirements of Shipping Act, which authorized Federal
Maritime Commission to determine whether shipping agreements violated antitrust
laws).
107 See G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, supra note 31, at 647-48; F. DULLES, supra note
11, at 394-416; Marshall, The Future of the American Labor M'Iovement: The Role of Federal Law, 57 CH. KENT L. REV. 521, 525, 533 (1981).
108 Noble, Big Strkes Found on Decline in U.S., N.Y. Times, July 12, 1985, at A13,
col.3. Union membership decreased from 24% of the work force in 1968 to 18.8%
of the work force in 1984. Compare id. (1984 figure) with L. TODD & M. CURTI, supra
note 16, at 701 (1968 figure). As a result of this decline, strikes and other aggressive labor actions have decreased in recent years. Noble, supra, at A13, col. 3.
109 See L. LITWACK, supra note 17, at 153-54; Marshall, supra note 107, at 543-44.
1 o See, e.g., Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.) (clause limiting work performance to union
affiliates did not violate antitrust laws), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Frito-Lay,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 7, 629 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1980) (clause limiting
work performance to union employees valid if intended to affect only primary employer); Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir.
1979) (collective bargaining provision limiting performance to union members was
legitimate means of work preservation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
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THE TESTS: AN ATTEMPT AT ORDER AMIDST DISORDER

To a large extent, the applicable tests of the labor exemption
may best be identified merely by tracing the Supreme Court's decisions since Apex. Due to the vagueness and generality of the
Court's language since 1940, however, an analysis of the major
antitrust labor exemption cases is still necessary to understand
the standards of each exemption. This is particularly so for cases
involving the nonstatutory exemption; decisions like Connell have
left the business community confused as to the limits of permissible conduct."'
A.

The Statutory Exemption

As interpreted by the courts, the statutory exemption applies
only to unions and union conduct." 12 A definition of its scope is,
however, important for employers. Otherwise, business may well
fail to comprehend the permissible limits of union conduct.
The Supreme Court recently restated the test for the statutory exemption in H.A. Artists & Associates v. Actors' Equity Association. " 3 In order to gain the benefit of the statutory exemption, a
union must act in its self-interest and not in combination with a
nonlabor group. 1 4 The first prong of this test has been said to
require that the matter at issue involve a "labor dispute"-a controversy over the terms and conditions of employment.' 15 The
I II In addition, businessmen cannot be blind to the clear trend of Supreme Court
authority against private antitrust actions. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984) (parent corporation incapable of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (tying arrangement actionable only if consumers were
forced to purchase a particular service); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981) (no automatic damages for Robinson-Patman violations); Continental TV. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (rule of reason test for territorial restrictions on distribution process). But see Blue Shield v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (broad interpretation of standing under the antitrust laws); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (reaffirmation
of per se rule for indirect price-fixing by agreement on credit terms).
112 See Huicheson, 312 U.S. at 236; C & K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 19822 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,830, at 72,134 (W.D. Pa.); Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v.
William Morris Agency, 411 F. Supp. 403, 407 (C.D. Cal. 1976); see also Pennington,
381 U.S. at 661-62 (unions acting alone and in their own self-interest do not violate
Sherman Act).
I 13 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
114 Id. at 714-16.
115 Id. at 714 n.14; California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1980), rev d on other grounds, 459 U.S.
519 (1983). The Norris-LaGuardia Act defines a "labor dispute" as follows: "[Any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the as-
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often been said to require that the union act
latter prong has
",unilaterally."' 16 Nonetheless, it has been interpreted broadly to
include agreements between different "labor groups."' '7 Therefore, the latter prong excludes only agreements between labor
and nonlabor groups from the antitrust labor exemption."'
The elements of the H.A. Artists test seem quite certain and
open to little debate. Nevertheless, the application of the antitrust labor exemption to unilateral labor conduct remains problematical. In particular, difficulties can arise in defining a union's
self-interest and in determining exactly what constitutes unilateral conduct.
1. Union "Self-Interest"
The requirement that a union act in its own self-interest has
spawned a separate definitional controversy. An ad hoc test of
whether the matter bears "a reasonable relationship to a legitimate union interest" has emerged. " 9 There are, of course, some
matters that clearly involve terms and conditions of employment.
For example, direct strikes or picket lines designed to raise
wages, shorten hours, or improve health and safety conditions,
although disrupting a business's lawful functioning, are undeniably efforts by a union in its legitimate self-interest. 120 Such union
activities clearly fall within the exemption.
sociation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
116 H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 716, 717; see Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 807-09;
Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 531 (5th Cir. 1982);
Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 550-51
(9th Cir. 1974).
117 American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968); see also JouJou Designs, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 643 F.2d 905,
910-11 (2d Cir. 1981) (agreements between two unions exempt).
118 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
'1'9 The district court in Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. William Morris Agency, 411
F.Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1976), explained this test as follows: "[T]he test to determine if a union's actions are in its 'self-interest' has not been precisely formulated.
But the principle that emerges from the relevant cases is that a union's acts are in
its 'self-interest'. . .if they bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate union interest." Id. at 410. This appears to be the best subtest for this prong, although it
requires an ad hoc review of each situation.
120 See, e.g., Utilities Servs. Eng'g, Inc. v. Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 549 F.2d 173, 178 (10th Cir. 1977) (picketing); Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace,
1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,931, at 68,024-25 (N.D. Cal.) (direct boycott). But
see Altemose Constr. Co. v. Atlantic County Bldg. Trades Council, 493 F.Supp.
1181 (D.N.J. 1980) (no statutory exemption for violent picket activity).

19861

ANTITRUST LABOR EXEMPTION

Other matters, however, only partially or tangentially touch
the terms and conditions of employment. They therefore raise
legitimate questions about a union's motivation for its actions
and the extent to which such activities relate to legitimate union
interests.1 2 H.A. Artists itself illustrates these questions. There,
an actors' union had developed a licensing system of regulation
of theatrical agents, under which union members were prohibited from using agents who had not been "licensed" by the
union.122 A group of agents challenged the system as a restraint
of trade.' 2 3 Their case logically asked how a union could arrogate to itself the power to license anyone, much less persons
outside the union. The lower courts, however, were not so taken
aback by the licensing scheme. 2 4 They viewed the union's conduct as an effort at legitimate self-protection in the form of maintenance of wage levels.' 2 5 The Supreme Court also upheld the
licensing system in general, 2 6 but found an arrangement pursuant to which the union charged the agents fees in return for in27
clusion on the licensed list illegal.'
121 The limits of "legitimate union concerns" are sometimes murky, reflecting
political and other social conduct of unions. Compare Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1375 (1st Cir. 1981) (embargo of
Soviet Union not protected union activity), affd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 212
(1982) with Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 50-51 (2d Cir.
1960) (boycott of Arab vessels did not restrain competition within meaning of antitrust laws).
122 H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 707, 709. As the Supreme Court explained, to obtain
a license, an agent had to agree to comply with union regulations regarding the
amount of commissions the agents would charge. Id. at 709-10. The union also
charged a franchise fee for such a license. Id. at 710.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 711-13; see also H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 478 F.
Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (district court opinion), aff'd, 622 F.2d 647 (2d Cir.
1980) (appellate court opinion), afld in part, 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
125 See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 711-12. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit explained its reasoning as follows: "The possibility that jobhungry actors will work through agents who take excessive commissions is a matter
of legitimate union concern. The goal of the agent restrictions is the elimination of
wage competition, traditionally one of the most sacrosanct goals of national labor
policy." H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 622 F.2d 647, 651 (2d Cir.
1980), afld in part, 451 U.S. 704 (1981). The United States Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning. H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 721-22.
126 H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 721-22.
127 See id. at 722. The Court explained: "If Equity did not impose these franchise
fees upon the agents, there is no reason to believe that any of its legitimate interests
would be affected." Id. The Court rejected the union's arguments that the fees
were needed to cover the union's costs in administering the license system and that
they were analogous to fees charged employers for union hall costs. Id. at 722 &
n.31. The Court reasoned: "Assuming that hiring hall fees are [legal under labor
law], the fees are borne by parties who directly benefit from the employment serv-
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The type of regulation of nonunion parties by the union involved in H.A. Artists presses the outer limits of legitimate union
self-interest. Under it, unions could conceivably impose direct
restrictions on employers, which their business partners and suppliers could not legally impose and which the courts have regularly condemned. 2 8 Presumably, the courts will draw the line at
that point and nip such a potentially blatant antitrust violation in
the bud.1 29 After H.A. Artists, however, it is not clear whether the
statutory exemption will assist or impede such preventive line
drawing.
2.

"Unilateral" Action

Equally ambiguous is the requirement that unions refrain
from acting in combination with a nonlabor group. When does a
union act "unilaterally"? What if two unions act together? Is
every combination of union and employer necessarily outside of
the statutory exemption? The complete answer to these questions lies in the line of cases giving rise to the nonstatutory exemption. Nevertheless, the courts take a liberal approach to this
prong, interpreting it broadly to include agreements between the
union and persons or groups with whom the union or its members have "job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests."'3 0 As with
every test for the labor exemption, the language is problematical.
For example, what kind of "economic relationship" affects or
does not affect legitimate union "interests"?
In American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,"'' the Supreme
Court applied the aforementioned liberal approach to the characterization of labor and nonlabor groups. In Carroll, regulations
ices of the hiring halls and are collected by the entities that provide them. That is
not true in the present case." Id. at 722 n.31.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco
Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
129 See, e.g., Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (fact
question presented regarding legality of union/multi-employer agreement fixing
compensation for playwrights).
130 American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968) (quoting
Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
rev'd in part, 372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967), vacated and renianded, 391 U.S. 99 (1968));
accord H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 721-22 (quoting Carroll); Warnick v. Washington
Educ. Ass'n, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,063, at 68,707 (E.D. Wash.) (same);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild, 531 F. Supp. 578, 588-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (same), afjd, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
131 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
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adopted by a musicians' union had created a strict set of regulations for the dates of performances at clubs. 132 The regulations
required orchestra leaders to employ a minimum number of performers and to charge specified prices. 13 3 The regulations also
controlled the nature of engagements at which the musicians
could appear. 34 A group of orchestra leaders opposed the regulations. They claimed that the regulations imposed on them by
the musicians' union constituted an illegal agreement with a nonlabor group. 3 5 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention because the leaders were also musicians playing in the
bands or groups. 1 36 They wore two hats, one as employer and
one as employee. Therefore, according to the Court, the orchestra leaders worked in direct competition with the union's members for shares of the performance fees and
thus constituted a
137
labor group rather than a nonlabor group.
The same can be said, however, of many, if not all, employers. Putting aside corporate formalities, employers or their executive officers often work with their employees. In that sense, they
too compete with their employees for a share of the revenues
from their joint venture. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say
that any agreement between a union and employers arising from
collective bargaining necessarily involves an economic relationship affecting union interests. Therefore, the only really pertinent question in determining the applicability of the statutory
exemption is whether the matters at issue are legitimate union
interests. This question is, of course, the first prong of the test of
the statutory exemption. Why, then, perpetuate the confusing
second part of this test?
The bedeviling nature of the second prong is further illustrated in Warnick v. Washington Education Association.'13 In that
case, a teachers' union had contracted with an insurance broker
and selected insurance agents in order to create a tax sheltered
annuity (TSA) program for the union's members.' 3 9 In return,
the union promised to "sponsor" and "endorse" only that pro132

Id. at 104.

133 Id.
134 Id. at 105.
135 Id. at 101.
136

See id. at 103, 106.

137 Id. at 105-06.
138

1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

139 Id. at 68,705.

66,063 (E.D. Wash.).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

30

[Vol. 16:4

gram.140 Participation in the program was optional.14' By signing
a special "salary reduction agreement," however, a union member would be assured that a portion of his or her wages would
automatically be paid to the annuity company. 42 The court
found this arrangement immune from antitrust prosecution
under the statutory exemption, reasoning that the defendant insurance agents and broker had "an 'economic relationship' with
the union. . . 'affecting legitimate union interests.' ",'
This analysis simply goes too far to be an acceptable interpretation of the statutory exemption. It completely ignores the
anticompetitive impact on the insurance industry, as well as the
intention underlying the conduct. If Warnick is correct, virtually
any agreement by a union would be exempt from antitrust
liability.
3.

Some Parting Observations

A more workable test for the statutory exemption is possible.
Since the statutory exemption emanates from the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts, it is not unreasonable to limit the exemption to the collective bargaining agenda that those acts were
designed to legitimate-matters concerning the terms and conditions of employment.' 4 4 Confining the statutory exemption in
this way would not leave unions without a labor exemption, nor
would it deprive traditional nonlabor groups such as manageId.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 68,707. The court also held that, in any event, the type of agreement
involved was not an antitrust violation. Id. District Judge McNichols stated: "It
strikes me that a union or a business entity still has a right to decide with whom it
wishes to do business." Id. The court also noted that
[t]his arrangement between [the Washington Education Association]
and its members does not bar the plaintiffs from the market nor does it
permit the defendant agents to maintain a dominant market position.
[Association] members are not forced to deal with the defendant agents
in purchasing TSA's. Rather, the teachers may purchase the TSA's from
competitor agents or they may choose not to purchase TSA's at all.
Id. at 68,706 (footnote omitted). This latter holding may yet save the decision from
error.
144 See, e.g., National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Constructors Ass'n, 678
F.2d 492, 502 (4th Cir. 1982) (injunction against union activity proper when it allowed union to continue engaging in legitimate methods of collective bargaining).
But see King & Smith, New Antitrust Developments Affecting Labor Law, 33 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 945, 952-53 (1982) (criticizing this decision as a "potential disruption of the
collective bargaining process").
140
141
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ment of any antitrust exemption in their dealings with labor; it
would simply remit them to the nonstatutory exemption.
A final note on the statutory exemption is in order. As noted
at the outset of this discussion, it is often flatly stated that the
statutory exemption is available only to unions and labor groups
and affords no protection to employers. 4 5 Whether it protects
unilateral employer conduct, however, has expressly been left
open by the Supreme Court.' 4 6 Several lower courts have held
that it does.' 4 7 Carefully tracking the language of the statutes,
these courts have concluded that protection should extend to all
constructive conduct directed at wages, hours, and working conditions, regardless of whose conduct it is. 1 48 The focus of these

decisions, however, is on whether the conduct at issue violated
the antitrust laws, rather than on the applicability of the labor
14 9
exemption to such unilateral employer conduct.
In short, whether the statutory exemption encompasses unilateral employer conduct remains unresolved. Nevertheless, the
cases that have responded affirmatively represent a salutary recognition that employers too should be protected when they pursue legitimate labor-related objectives and when unions seek to
invoke the antitrust laws to bar such employer self-interest. 5 0 In
145 See Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 530 (5th
Cir. 1982); Note, Post-Connell Development of Labor's Nonstatutory Exemption from the
Antitrust Laws, 22 B.C.L. REV. 847, 855 n.53 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Labor's Nonstatutory Exemption].
146 Watson, Antitrust Claims in Labor DisputesAfter Associated General Contractors:
A Prognosis, 34 LABOR L.J. 344, 348 (1983); see Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 & n.17 (1983).
147 See generally Scheinholtz & Kettering, Exemption Under the Antitrust Laws forJoint
Employer Activity, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 347, 350-54 (1983); see also infra notes 148-149
(cases dealing with exemption for unilateral conduct).
148 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d
133, 136 (8th Cir. 1979); Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); Clune
v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520, 528-30 (S.D.N.Y.), affj'd, 314 F.2d 343 (2d
Cir. 1963).
149 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 372-73 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v.J.P.
Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1980).
150 This view accords with the recent trend to limit standing to assert private
antitrust claims to situations based upon a review of the focus and purpose of the
claim and the factual context in which it is asserted. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537-39 (1983); Province v. Cleveland Press Publishing Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,817, at
67,426 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See generally Comment, Antitrust Standing: Labor is Given a
New Test in Associated General Contractors, 61 DENVER L.J. 77 (1983) (discussion
of Associated General Contractors). As one commentator has noted, "[ulnions are not
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addition, in light of the more equal balance between labor and
business that has emerged in the second half of this century, it is
also reasonable to accord employers the right to pursue legitimate labor-related activity in order to counter the power and collective activity of unions. 55'
B.

The Nonstatutory Exemption

The nonstatutory exemption embodies the recognition that
the statutory exemption alone does not address many situations
where legitimate labor activity runs afoul of traditional antitrust
dogma.15 2 The nonstatutory exemption applies to unions acting
together with employers or employer groups, 53 to employers
55
acting alone,1 54 and to employers acting with other employers, 1
provided, of course, that their conduct satisfies the standards of
the exemption.
Sound policy supports the view that the antitrust labor exemption is not limited to unions and that employers are also entiusually in the class of those whom the antitrust laws were intended to protect because they ordinarily seek to benefit from the statutory restriction in competition in
the market for certain labor services." Comment, Antitrust Standing After Associated
General Contractors: The Issue of Employee Retaliatory Discharge, 63 B.U.L. REV. 983,
1005 n.150 (1983).
151 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957) (multiemployer bargaining units upheld as legal); see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 502 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (airlines may combine in order
to alleviate adverse effects of strikes on individual companies).
152 An incisive description of the interplay of these policies is contained in Signatory Negotiating Comm. v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 447 F. Supp.
1384 (D. Colo. 1978):
These labor laws reflect a social policy involving humanistic values
far different from the economic model of free market competition protected by the antitrust statutes. The mutual exclusivity of these systems
regulating business competition and organized labor is more apparent
as an abstraction than it is in the actual interplay of forces in any given
factual context.
Id. at 1389; see also Steinberg, supra note 105, at 1333 (nonstatutory exemption balances labor policy against antitrust policy).
153 See Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930, 935-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Michigan
State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,801, at 71,946 (E.D. Mich.); see also Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v.Over-TheRoad Teamsters, Local 544, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,042, at 68,624 (D.
Minn.) (agreement between union and single employer).
154 Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133,
136 (8th Cir. 1979).
'55 See Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298, 1306,
1310 (E.D. Wash. 1981). But cf. Mann, Powers & Roberts, The Accommodation Between
Antitrust and Lgbor Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 744, 74954 (1978) (nonstatutory exemption protects only union-employer agreements).
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tied to its protections. 56 If we wish to encourage collective
bargaining, then both sides to the process must be able to proceed without the specter of future antitrust liability hanging over
them. Otherwise, the parties may hesitate to address all of the
legitimate labor concerns encompassed by Federal labor policy. 157 This is especially so in those situations where the balance
of power favors the union, enabling it to compel employers to
agree to terms that they would otherwise resist. In such a case,
there is a legitimate need to protect employers from antitrust
liability.
Such protection may be elusive, however, because the tests
for the nonstatutory exemption are ambiguous and problematical. As shown earlier, the courts' vague language and the shifting
priorities and power balance between labor and business have
produced confusing statements of the test. The Supreme Court's
"follows naturally" language in Connell 158 has generally been restated-albeit without explication-in subsequent cases and
commentaries.' 59 Nevertheless, most authorities have sought to
return to the earlier formulations of the test in Apex, Jewel Tea,
156 See Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 530 (5th
Cir. 1982) (nonstatutory exemption protects employer in appropriate circumstances); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976)
(same), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp.,
494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974) (employers may claim nonstatutory
exemption).
157 See Mid-America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist.
Council, 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). The Mid-America
court stated:
Although both the statutory and the nonstatutory exemptions are
generally phrased as exemptions for union behavior, logic dictates that
they be applied to all parties when an agreement with a union forms the
basis of a complaint. The exemptions would serve little purpose in furthering national labor policy if employers risked liablity under the antitrust laws for entering into collective bargaining agreements. Other
circuits have concurred in this judgment. "To preserve the integrity of
the negotiating process, employers who bargain in good faith must be
entitled to claim the antitrust exemption."
Id. at 890 n.22 (quoting Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847
n.14 (3d Cir. 1974)).
In United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949), the
Supreme Court noted that "benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized. . .to
pull employers' chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." Id. at 464. The Federal courts
have not followed this view in recent times, however.
158 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 625; see also supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text
(discussing Connell).
15,9 See, e.g., Pan Alaska Trucking v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 1985-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,789, at 63,896 (D. Alaska).
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and Pennington.'10 Drawing upon these cases and, in particular,
upon Mr. Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea, 6 ' the following
three-pronged test appears to have emerged:
(1) Is the conduct at issue intimately related to "a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining," such as wages,
hours, or working conditions?
(2) Does it "primarily [affect] only the parties" who
stand in a collective bargaining relationship to each other?
(3) Is it6 2 "the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining"? '

If the defendant prevails on these three questions, then it is exempt
from antitrust liability. If the answer to any of the questions is negative, then the court must proceed to a traditional antitrust analysis
and determine whether there has been a violation. Generally, this
requires an analysis of whether there is an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy 6 3 and whether the purpose and effect of the
64
matter unreasonably restrains competition in the relevant market. 1
160 See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text (Pennington formulation); see also
Note, Labor's Nonstatutory Exemption, supra note 145, at 866-67 (lower courts have
consistently distinguished Connel).
161 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
162 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); accord McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d
1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild, 531 F.
Supp. 578, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), afd, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Because the
exemption is an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each
of these elements. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602
F.2d 494, 517 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).
163 The mere fact that the parties have entered into an agreement does not necessarily mean that there is a combination or conspiracy. See California Dump Truck
Owners Ass'n v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 611, 614 (9th Cir.
1977); Genser v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 134, 522 F. Supp.
1153, 1159-60 (N.D. I11.1981); cf.James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 1984-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,236, at 67,005 (D. Del.) (evidence of meetings and communication
necessary to raise inference of conspiracy). Of course, some actionable antitrust
wrongs do not require an agreement, combination, or conspiracy; they may be unlawful under § 2 of the Sherman Act. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of
Educ., 715 F.2d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1983). As the lVickham court noted, Connell itself
involved a § 2 case, not a conspiracy claim. Id. The decidedly more common claim,
however, is under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
164 The weight of authority favors applying the rule of reason to antitrust questions that arise in a labor context. Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div.,
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484,
491 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Handler, supra note 88, at 239-40; see also Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusing to determine whether perse
analysis or rule of reason should apply); cf. Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa.
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Each one of these prongs will be considered in turn.
1.

The "Intimately Related" Requirement

The first prong of the test stems from the labor law requirement that management and unions bargain collectively over
wages, hours, and working conditions. 1 65 Any matter "intimately
related" to these so-called "mandatory subjects of collective bargaining" potentially meets the test. 16 6 Such matters include work
preservation, job security, and safety requirements. 16 7 Even oppressive union demands such as prohibitions against a company's
ceasing business or moving from a particular locale can fall
within these parameters because such demands involve job preservation objectives.' 68 This type of union conduct is "reasonably
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 427-28 (3d Cir.) (per se analysis may
sometimes be appropriate), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). See generally Comment,
Antitrust Law in the Labor-ManagementContext: The Employer as Defendant and the Union as
Plaintiff,32 BAYLOR L. REV. 385, 395-98 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The
Labor-Management Context] (discussing both per se rule and rule of reason); infra notes
282-297 and accompanying text (same).
165 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Mr. Justice White explained inJewel Tea:
[The] exemption for union-employer agreements is very much a matter
of accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of the
labor laws. Employers and unions are required to bargain about wages,
hours and working conditions, and this fact weighs heavily in favor of
antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects. But neither party
need bargain about other matters and either party commits an unfair
labor practice if it conditions its bargaining upon discussions of a nonmandatory subject.
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689 (White, J., plurality opinion); see also Zimmer & Silberman,
Pennington andJewel Tea: Antitrust Impact on Collective Bargaining, 11 ANTITRUST BULL.
857, 867-69 (1966) (discussingJewel Tea). Several cases have held that, in defining
a "mandatory subject of collective bargaining," the court should look to labor law,
since that area is the source of the term. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977);
Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,262, at 67,145
(S.D.N.Y.).

166 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (setting forth test for nonstatutory
exemption).
167 See, e.g., Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Suburban
Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1301, 1310 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
168 See, e.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union
Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In upholding such a provision,
the National Dairy court stated:
It is plain that the contractual limitation from which plaintiffs seek
to escape is squarely within the legitimate and familiar concerns of labor
unions. .

.

. The achievement and preservation of minimum standards

for wages, hours and other conditions "in a given industry or market
area" . . .are among the classical objectives of organized labor. ...
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related to legitimate union objectives" (to borrow from the statutory exemption cases) and "follows naturally" from the elimination of competition that sometimes results from collective
bargaining.
Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping
Association 169 illustrates this first prong of the nonstatutory exemption. In Intercontinental Container, a longshoremen's union
and a multi-employer bargaining association for several shipping
companies signed a contract requiring that all "stuffing and stripping" of ship cargoes be performed by the union's longshoremen.' 70 The plaintiff, a company in the business of handling
cargoes without expensive union labor, claimed that the agreement was illegal because its effect was to exclude companies that
were not part of the shipping association from the cargo handling business.' 7 ' The Second Circuit held that the agreement
was immune from the antitrust laws under the labor exemption. 172 The court reasoned that the union had a right to preserve
the jobs of its members by compelling the employers' association
to accede to its manning requirements, even though the agreement severely curtailed market entry by nonunion cargo
73
handlers.
The evident and undisputed purpose [here at issue], centered exclusively upon preservation of hard-won labor standards, differs totally
from the nonexempted situations where unions, usually in combination
with employers, aim designedly to stifle or eliminate competition or
competitors.
Id. at 986 (citations omitted).
169 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970).
170 Id. at 886. The type of clause involved had a tortuous history in the courts for
more than a decade after IntercontinentalContainer. See King & Smith, supra note 144,
at 989-90; Comment, ConsolidatedExpress, supra note 12, at 647 n.14. That history is
immaterial to this discussion, since the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the
Second Circuit regarding the legitimacy of the union rule at issue. See NLRB v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490 (1980).
171 IntercontinentalContainer, 426 F.2d at 886.
172 Id. at 887-88.
173 Id. The court of appeals stated:
Union activity having as its object the preservation of jobs for union
members is not violative of the anti-trust laws. ...
In our case it appears that containerization has for many years been
a bitterly contested issue in the negotiations between ILA and
NYSA. .

.

.Thus it appears that, far from aiding and abetting a viola-

tion of the Sherman Act by a group of business men, the union here,
acting solely in its own self-interest, forced reluctant employers to yield
to certain of its demands. Under these circumstances the resulting
agreement is within the protection of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws.
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Few would seriously argue that job preservation is not a legitimate union goal. When the means proffered by the union to
attain that goal restrain business competition in the relevant market, however, then labor's actions are fairly questioned from an
antitrust bent. Under the current formulations of the first prong
of the nonstatutory exemption, the relevant questions in this regard are whether the conduct at issue is intimately related to
wages, hours, and working conditions, and whether such conduct
flows naturally from an agreement between labor and management concerning these subjects. IntercontinentalContainermakes it
clear that the "intimately related" and "follows naturally" language in Jewel Tea and Connell, respectively, can encourage union
restraints that stall the business progress and modernization necessary to keep the American economy competitive within itself
and with the economies of other nations. Surely the antitrust labor exemption was never intended to apply to restraints that so
blatantly grind the gears of the market mechanism.
IntercontinentalContainer reveals that the first prong of the test
for the nonstatutory exemption is woefully inadequate. Rather
than striking a salutary balance between antitrust and labor law,
it simply subjugates the antitrust laws to the apparent primacy of
labor policy. This state of the law is especially disconcerting to
employers. On the one hand, IntercontinentalContainer would appear to sanction almost any union action aimed at wages, hours,
and working conditions, regardless of the resulting effect on free
competition. Employers may, therefore, be inclined in the bargaining process to acquiesce earlier and with less recalcitrance to
union demands in order to avoid the potential damage of a work
stoppage whenever the proposed agreement seems to involve,
even only minimally, legitimate labor goals. In reaching agreements with labor, however, employers must take into account the
treble damage hammer that their competitors might wield
against them if their assessments of the antitrust implications of
the unions' demands are inaccurate. To avoid placing employers
in this precarious position, the courts must acknowledge and address the basic imprecision of the phrases "intimately related"
and "follows naturally." This language is conducive only to a
Id. at 887-88 (citations omitted); see also Consolidated Express Co. v. New York
Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1979) (detailing development of
containerized shipping and the consequent labor problems), vacated, 448 U.S. 902
(1980).
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subjective analysis of antitrust implications and is, even then, decidedly vague.
Much of this ambiguity stems from the effort to engraft labor
law language onto antitrust cases. 17 4 To alleviate the problem,
the courts should seek and adopt a more objective standard.
Language determinative of the exemption's applicability should
be borrowed from antitrust authority. For example, the first
prong could be restated as follows: Is the conduct at issue directly connected to the negotiation or improvement of wages,
hours, and working conditions in a manner not having the purpose or effect of unreasonably limiting commercial competition?
Such a formulation would replace the subjective and methodologically imprecise "intimately related" language with a more
objective analysis, focusing on the causal relationship between
means and ends. A union must advocate means that directly improve wages, hours, and working conditions.
Moreover, the methods advanced by a union must not evince
any anticompetitive effect. This part of the proposed analysis
would also be more objective. If, for example, a contract produced and executed at a collective bargaining session prevents
access to the relevant market by noncontracting parties, then this
should be considered an objective manifestation of anticompetitive intent violative of the antitrust laws. At that point, the restraint on free competition "flows" deliberately from the designs
of the union and not "naturally" from an agreement on wages,
hours, and working conditions. Under this analysis, the union's
goals are legitimate, but the means advocated to realize those
goals violate the Federal antitrust laws.
The most obvious types of conduct that fail this newly postulated test-and which are not "intimately related" to and do not
"follow naturally" from mandatory subjects of collective bargaining-are attempts to fix prices and divide the market place in order to eliminate horizontal competition. 75 These attempts are
174 See Gibbons, The AntitrustJurisprdenceof the Third Circuit, 40 REC. A. B. Crry
N.Y. 198, 246 (1985); see also Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 439 (3d Cir.) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (opining
that majority was uncomfortable with application of antitrust principles in a labor
case), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
175 Mr. Justice White explained in jewel Tea:
Jewel, for example, need not have bargained about or agreed to a schedule of prices at which its meat would be sold and the unions could not
legally have insisted that it do so. But if the unions had made such a
demand,Jewel had agreed and the United States or an injured party had
challenged the agreement under the antitrust laws, we seriously doubt
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classic antitrust wrongs, constituting per se violations in a nonlabor context. 1 76 They also are not legitimate union endeavors.
Employers who agree or join with unions for such purposes cannot clothe their conduct with immunity merely because it occurs
in a labor context.
Allen Bradley, 177 discussed earlier, remains the prototype for
this type of conduct.' 78 The union's efforts to police its restrictive agreement were so successful that the signatory employers
all but monopolized the area, causing a rise in wages and a consequent rise in prices.' 79 Given the finding that a primary motive of
the signatory employers had been to achieve precisely such a result,' 8 ° it was appropriate to hold the conduct illegal. 8 " Thus,
under traditional antitrust "purpose or effect" analysis (similar to
the new test suggested above for the first prong of the nonstatutory exemption), the result in Allen Bradley is easily understood
and explained.
The subsequent engrafting onto Allen Bradley of the qualifications in Pennington,Jewel Tea, and Connell (the three-pronged test
discussed above) has been criticized by some commentators as
adding unnecessary confusion to the exemption.' 8 2 These qualifications, however, are logical complements to the changes that
that either the unions or Jewel could claim immunity by reason of the
labor exemption, whatever substantive questions of violation there
might be.
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689 (White, J., plurality opinion); accord Telecom Plus v. Local
3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 719 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1983).
176 See infra note 296 and accompanying text (explaining per se analysis).
177 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing Allen Bradley).
178 Comment, Five Years, supra note 73, at 804; see Sovern, supra note 55, at 960.
179 Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 800.
180 Id. at 807, 809.
181 Id. at 810. The Court held that unions may not "aid non-labor groups to

create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services."
Id. at 808.
182 Professor Milton Handler, an active antitrust practitioner, has complained:
For the Doric simplicity of the triad of Apex, Huicheson and AllenBradley, we now have the uncertainties of what conduct is intimately related to wages, hours and conditions of employment, which mandatory
subjects are and which are not exempt, and finally which unfair labor
practices are within antitrust's coverage and which are not. Frankly,
whatever may have been the deficiencies of the pre-Pennington labor-antitrust tenets, I cannot perceive how these post-Penninglon changes encompass any improvement. I do perceive how they compound the
confusions and uncertainties with which this murky field abounds. I
thus adhere to the view frequently expressed by me that antitrust is a
singularly inappropriate weapon to curb labor union abuses and that
such abuses should be prohibited by specific labor legislation with specific and exclusive remedies.
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have occurred in the nature of the relationship between unions
and management in the post-World War II years. Collective bargaining agreements have become increasingly complex; labor's
power has grown and unions have extended their agreements to
affiliates of employers and to more sophisticated aspects of the
worker-management relationship such as automation and relocation."' Therefore, the courts should strive to clarify this aspect
of the labor antitrust exemption.
2.

The "Primarily Affects Only" Requirement

The second prong of the test for the nonstatutory exemption
asks whether the conduct at issue "primarily affects only" parties
who stand in a collective bargaining relationship to each other.' 8 4
This inquiry links the nonstatutory exemption to the principal
public policy underlying the labor laws: the promotion of collective bargaining. 185 It seeks to assure that those directly affected
by the conduct at issue are the participants in the collective bargaining process.' 8 6 Not even labor law permits secondary boycotts and coercive secondary activity. 8 7 Therefore, the courts
Handler, supra note 104, at 577; cf. King & Moser, supra note 53, at 85-88 (Connell
refined standards set forth in Pennington and Jewel Tea).
183 The development of more sophisticated and qualified tests is all the more
appropriate as labor now moves into the corporate board room and gains a direct
voice in management decisions. See generally Forst, Labor Union Representation on
Boards of Corporate Competitors: An Antitrust Analysis, 7 J. CORP. L. 421, 431 (1982);
Note, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 92 YALE L.J. 106, 107-09
(1982).
184 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., Zifchak, Labor-Antitrust Principles Applicable to Joint Labor-Management
Conduct, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 365 (1983). Zifchak states that "[t]he national labor policy, expressed in the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts, is that unionization and
collective bargaining are to be promoted." Id. at 366.
186 See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982).
187 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982) (added by
Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(b), 73 Stat. 519, 543 (1959)). This
section provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any
of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with
any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible and void ...
Id. This is the so-called "hot cargo" prohibition. See also NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) (union committed unfair labor practice when it forced general contractor to dismiss nonunion subcontractor). Compare
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 105 (1958) (pre-
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have sensibly reasoned that it would be inappropriate to accord
8
special treatment under antitrust law to such conduct. Legitimate union activity, however, will often substantially
affect groups outside the collective bargaining situation. Given
this fact, the second prong often becomes blatantly problematical. A literal application of the phrase "primarily affects only"
would mean that many agreements between labor and management arising from bona fide collective bargaining would necessarily fall outside of the antitrust labor exemption. The more
appropriate inquiry under the second prong is to ascertain who is
actually bound by the agreement and then analyze the degree to
which the activity at issue affects outsiders to the collective bargaining relationship.' 8 9 This prong should thus be broken into
two parts: (a) the matter at issue must "directly bind" only parties who stand in a collective bargaining relationship to each
other; and (b) it must "affect primarily," though not only, those
parties.
Stated in this way, the second prong would take into account
the reality that much of what goes on between unions and employers affects other groups in the corporate, commercial, and
industrial worlds. As currently constructed, the second prong
largely ignores this fact of capitalistic life. As a result, an anomaly has arisen whereby the same labor-related conduct that is
subject to the antitrust laws because it affects outsiders is exempt
if it occurs in the context of a collective bargaining agreement.
For example, the union in Connell, Local 100 of the Plumbers &
Steamfitters organization, had picketed Connell in an attempt to
compel it to subcontract work only to contractors unionized by
Landrum-Griffin Act law allowed employer to acquiesce to hot cargo provision) with
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967) (post-Act rule
is that even voluntary observance by employers of "hot cargo" provisions is now
illegal).
188 See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 61-62
(1978); Connell, 421 U.S. at 626; Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. &
Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1373 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Comment, Five Years,
supra note 73, at 810-15 (discussing ramifications of Connell); Comment, Connell:
Broadening Labor s Antitrust Liability IVhile NarrowingIts Construction Industry Proviso Profection, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 305, 318 (1978) (Supreme Court has condemned preda-

tory union practices).
'"
See, e.g., Berman Enters. Inc. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930, 935 (2d Cir.) (analyzing indirect effect of agreement on third parties), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,262, at 67,145-46 (S.D.N.Y.) (analyzing indirect effects on later union members).
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that Local.' 9 ° Local 100, however, did not represent Connell's
employees; 9 ' therefore, its goal was to bring an outsider to its
knees. The Supreme Court held that this was impermissible if a
union wished to claim exemption from the antitrust laws. 19 2 Connell left open, however, the possibility that the same type of conduct would not be illegal if committed in the context of a
collective bargaining agreement.' 93 Lower Federal courts, grappling with Connell's confusing language, immediately fastened on
that distinction. 194 Moreover, in 1982, the Supreme Court itself
upheld conduct otherwise violative of the antitrust laws simply
because it grew out of a collective bargaining situation. 95
Under the current formulation of the second prong, primary
emphasis is placed on the collective bargaining relationship.
Even plainly restrictive conduct has been accorded immunity if it
is the outgrowth of a collective bargaining agreement. For exam190 Connell, 421 U.S. at 620.
191 Id. at 619.
192 Id. at 626.
193 See id. at 625-26. The Landrum-Griffin Act itself provides this exception for
an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done" at construction sites or projects. National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e)
(1982) (added by Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(b), 73 Stat. 519,
543 (1959)). See generally Note, Hot Cargo Agreements Under the National Labor Relations
Act: An Analysis of Section 8(e), 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1963).
194 See, e.g., California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 613 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Bullard Contracting Corp., 464 F.
Supp. 312, 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
462 F. Supp. 1301, 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1978). For example, the court in Bullard
explained:
The presence of this collective-bargaining relationship between the parties is the controlling distinction between this case and Connell. Since
the subcontracting and union security clauses were negotiated in the
context of that relationship they do not fall under the proscription of
Connell and are exempt from the sanctions of the antitrust laws ...
The whole thrust of the Connell opinion was directed at the impact
caused by the absence of the collective-bargaining relationship.
Bullard, 464 F. Supp. at 316.
195 Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982). The
Court explained that "[section] 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act ordinarily
shelters union signatory subcontracting clauses that are sought or negotiated in the
context of a collective-bargaining relationship, even when not limited in application
to particular jobsites at which both union and nonunion workers are employed."
Id.; see also Gigliotti Corp. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,992, at 68,386 (E.D. Pa.) (labor laws protect pre-hire agreement negotiated during collective bargaining). In labor law parlance, a "union signatory
clause" is one which bars an employer from dealing with companies that have not
signed a union contract. See, e.g., Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1, 2-3 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960
(1966).
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pie, in Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co. ,
Pabst, in response to union pressure, signed a collective bargaining
agreement that contained a clause requiring it to cease dealing
with a distributor who used nonunion labor.' 9 v From the union's
standpoint, the clause plainly and intentionally restricted the distributor's access to the market. The court nevertheless held that
the union was exempt from antitrust prosecution:
It is important to note at the outset that, in contrast to
Connell.

. . the

agreement here is between a union and an em-

ployer of union members. Under such circumstanes, the
union has every right to negotiate a contract concerning its
members. Furthermore, the privileges and rights contracted
for in the CBA [collective bargaining agreement] between defendant [company] and the union are just the types of provisions mentioned in Jewel Tea. .

.

. Here the union was

interested in job protection for members of its union ...
Here, as in Jewel Tea, the limitation imposed upon plaintiff
does not stand alone, but rather it is mitigated by the vital interests of the union in job preservation.' 9 "
The Suburban Beverages clause, like the clause in Connell, affected a
vertical business relationship rather than a horizontal relationship.' 99 Current antitrust dogma holds such a competitive restraint
462 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
Id. at 1304.
198 Id. at 1310; cf. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198, 1203
(6th Cir. 1979) (suggesting limitation of exemption to agreements that affect only
parties to collective bargaining agreements); Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust
Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in Its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L. REV. 680, 712-14 (1980) (advocating modification of test for nonstatutory exemption).
199 "Horizontal" conspiracies seek to affect commerce at the same competitive
level of the market-for example, retailers preventing market entry by a competitive retailer seeking to charge lower prices. "Vertical" conspiracies, by contrast,
involve combinations across functional lines. See A.I. Root Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,674, at 63,177 (N.D. Ohio). For example, companies operating at different levels in the distribution process engage in
a vertical conspiracy when they agree to charge certain prices at the retail level or
when they agree to exclude a competitor of the retailer who refuses to adhere to
such resale price maintenance. See, e.g., id. The distinction is important because
while horizontal combinations are per se violations of the antitrust laws, vertical
combinations are generally tested under the rule of reason. Compare Continental
T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (rule of reason for vertical restraints) with United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 602 (1972) (per se
rule for horizontal restraints). In a labor context, the courts have sometimes held
vertical conspiracies illegal per se when they exclude direct competition with some of
the members of the illegal combination. See, e.g., Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 916 (1982).
196
197
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to be less pernicious than a horizontal boycott or other anticompetitive conduct at the same level of the market. Similar market-level
distinctions have produced less ironclad prohibitions than under
other aspects of the antitrust laws.2 0 0 This may explain and justify
the result in Suburban Beverages.
Suburban Beverages also shows that the determination of the second prong of the test for the nonstatutory exemption is sometimes
directly affected by the first prong. Where the subject of a bargained-for restriction is obviously a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, the courts will be less likely to look askance at tangential
or even direct effects on nonparties to the agreement.2 ' This is
logical because modern, broad-based collective bargaining agreements, particularly those agreements involving multi-employer
groups, will almost always have some effects beyond the bargaining
unit. An employer, then, cannot simply look to effects outside of the
bargaining unit either to reject the union's demand for agreement
or to combat a restrictive provision of another company's union
contracts. In the final analysis, employers must assess both the labor policy and the antitrust policy implications of their collective
bargaining agreements, as well as the effects flowing from such
agreements. They should not base their assessments solely or primarily on the characterization of parties as either insiders or outsiders to the collective bargaining process.
The Connell problem-effects outside the bargaining unit-is
not confined to third parties who are necessarily antagonists of the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement. For example, it sometimes arises in the context of so-called "double-breasted" firmscompanies that operate with separate affiliates, some of which are
unionized and others of which are not. 20 2 Berman Enterprises v. Local
20 3
333, United Marine Division, InternationalLongshoremen's Association'
provides an apt illustration of how this phenomenon can confound
simple analysis and predictability with respect to the second prong
200

See, e.g., Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58

(1977).
201 A corollary to this development is that union contracts reached via collective
bargaining lawfully cover and bind new union members who join the union after
the agreement is reached. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,262, at 67,145-46 (S.D.N.Y.); seeJ.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,
335 (1944); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866
(5th Cir. 1966).
202 See Carpenters Local 1846 v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1983-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,283, at 69,666 (E.D. La. 1981).
203 644 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
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of the test.

0 4

In Berman Enterprises, a group of tugboat and barge companies
in the New York harbor had been frustrating the tugboat employees'
union for years by shifting employees between its unionized company (General Marine) and a nonunion company (Berman). 2 5 This
mode of operation enabled Berman to qualify its union workers for
the benefits of the union pension fund.20 6 It also allowed Berman to
pay the workers less than union scale wages for much of their work,
however, and to require them to work nonunion hours. The controversy escalated after Berman successfully enjoined the union from
secondarily boycotting it when Berman insisted on towing vegetable
oil barges that were not manned as the union wished.20 7
The union attempted to put an end to its Berman frustrations
by insisting upon two clauses in a new collective bargaining agreement: one requiring all towing companies to refuse to tow vegetable oil barges unless they had two bargemen aboard, and the other
binding to the contract all companies affiliated with contract signatories. 20 8 Berman decided to test the clauses and sued the union
and its fellow companies in the bargaining association under the antitrust laws and the labor laws. 20 9 The district court held that both
clauses were immune from antitrust liability by virtue of the nonstatutory exemption. 21 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit affirmed, 2 1 ' and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.21 2
The Second Circuit summarily disposed of the "vegetable oil
clause" by holding that it clearly related to job preservation and
safety-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 2 31 Although
the court recognized that the clause affected nonunion companies, it
nevertheless found the clause legal because it "did not forbid the
use of nonunion members" and "did not impose any requirements
2 14
on any nonparty to the collective bargaining agreement.204

See generally King & Smith, supra note 144, at 955-56 (discussing Berman Enter-

prises); Kirkpatrick & Johnson, Antitrust Analysis of Non-Exempt Employee or Employer

Activities, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 401, 404 (1983) (same).
205 Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 932 & n.1.
206 See id.
207 Id. at 933.
208
209
210

Id.

Id. at 934.
Id.

Id. at 935-37, 939.
Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
213 Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 935.
214 Id.; see also California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v.Associated Gen. Contrac211

212
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This holding, while correct on its particular facts, is stated too
summarily. The vegetable oil clause prohibited the signatory companies from towing other companies' barges unless they carried two
bargemen, even though those other companies might be nonunion
or affiliated with another union.2 15 Admittedly, all that those companies had to do to avoid the problem was to put a second bargeman
on the barge. Since the Local 333 companies were the bulk of those
available to tow barges in that marketplace, however, the clause
would in most instances force non-Local 333 companies to adopt a
Local 333 standard, although that union had no legitimate interest
in the outside workers' conditions. The job preservation rationale,
therefore, was dubious. More persuasive, however, was the safety
rationale offered by the defense; there was evidence that tugboat
deckhands would occasionally have to climb aboard slippery barge
decks on the high seas if two bargemen were not aboard.21 6 Thus,
while the effects on outsiders were somewhat more direct than the
court recognized, they were still within a justifiable range to satisfy
the second prong of the test.
The Second Circuit found the "affiliates clause" in Berman Enterprises to be "more troublesome" because sound authority in the
labor field had held that such broad clauses, which are not restricted
to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, violate the labor
laws. 2 1 7 While the affiliates clause served a legitimate union goal by
promoting standardization of wages and working standards, it was
not limited to that goal. The defendants in Berman Enterprises were
able to avoid this problem, however, not because these types of
clauses fail to affect outsiders directly, but rather because the particular clause at issue did not do so on the facts of the case. Specifically, the court looked beyond the form of the Berman organization
to its substance and concluded that
Berman was not an independent, unrelated employer ...
[T]here was in reality but a single employer, with interrelated
operations, common management, and centralized control of
labor relations.

. .

and the affiliates clause vitally affected

tors, 562 F.2d 607, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding collective bargaining agreement that indirectly affected third parties).
215 See Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 933 & n.3.
216 See id. at 935 n.10.
217 Id. at 936; see, e.g., Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545, 558 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981); Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872,
883-84 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665-66 (unions may not conspire to limit competition); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local 137, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
623 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980) (work preservation clause may not affect employees
outside bargaining unit).
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working conditions and wages of the Union members. At least
for purposes of application of the antitrust exemption, it was a
legitimate union objective to protect employees against shifts
of work days (and vessels) designed to avoid the standards and
18
wages established in the collective bargaining agreement.'
The import of Berman Enterprises is clear. Companies in a "doublebreasted" organization will not necessarily be treated as separate
entities, even though they are technically separate corporations, if
they are not actually operated as separate and independent entities.
In the modern commercial world, however, legitimate tax and
other business considerations may lead a corporation to operate
through subsidiaries or affiliates, instead of through unincorporated
divisions.2" The Supreme Court has recently held that a corporation's motivations for structuring its interests in affiliate or parentsubsidiary form must be considered in testing whether there is a
conspiracy in a nonlabor context. 2 20 Those same motivations must
be considered when they are raised in a labor context. The substance rather than the form of a corporate family must be analyzed
before deciding whether double-breasted firms are permitted to recover or are held liable in labor-based actions. It remains to be
seen, however, precisely what degree of commonality in make-up
and functions will be deemed sufficient to invoke this rule. Once
again, it is recommended that reference be made to traditional antitrust dogma for an answer to this developing problem.2 2 '
Berman Enterprises highlights another important aspect of the
collective bargaining prong for employers in multi-employer bargaining associations: their inability to withdraw from the association
218 Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 936; see also South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local
627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800, 802 n.3 (1976) (separate enti-

ties considered single employer if their operations constitute an integrated
enterprise).
211) See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731,
2734 (1984); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.
19, 29 (1962). See generally Areeda, Intraentetprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L.

451 (1983); Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracotporate Conspiracy
Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981); Comment, Intraenteprise Antitrust Conspiracy:
A Decisionmaking Approach, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1732, 1739-45 (1983); Note, Parent
Corporation and Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary Incapable of Conspiring in Violation of Section
REv.

One of Sherman Act, 15

SETON HALL L. RvEv.

943 (1985).

See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2743
(1984).
221 The situation of controlled but not wholly-owned companies will be similarly
complicated. Compare United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 178
(1944) (controlled corporations) and United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 101-02
(1948) (affiliated companies) with Copperweld Corp. v. Independence rube Corp.,
104 S.Ct. 2731, 2736 (1984) (wholly-owned subsidiary).
220
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if the negotiations proceed against their individual interests. The
unionized Berman Company, General Marine, had purported to
withdraw from the multi-employer bargaining association when the
union made its demand for the special clauses during the negotiations for the collective bargaining agreement. Having initially authorized the association to bargain for it, however, General Marine
could not withdraw under settled labor law rules.2 22 Employers who
join multi-employer bargaining associations, therefore, must weigh
the efficiencies and benefits they hope to gain from the joint negotiating strength of such an association against the possibility that the
association will agree to provisions that they individually find unacceptable. Multi-employer bargaining associations must bargain for
the common good of at least the majority of their members, and the
special needs and idiosyncracies of individual employers may be sacrificed in the process. Though this situation is an incident of majority rule, it also occurs when other employers in the association are
unwilling to risk a strike or other union sanctions because of the
special problems of only some of the members. This is not to say
that there are no remedies for individual association members who
are injured in the collective bargaining process by antitrust violations. Rather, it means that they must either attack a claimed ex222 See NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Central Pa. Motor Carriers Conference v. Local 773,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 226 F. Supp. 795, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The court in Sheridan Creations explained this rule as follows:

The Board's rule ...

that withdrawal from a multi-employer unit is

untimely, absent union consent, once negotiations on a new contract
have started, seems to us logical ....

To permit withdrawal [by an as-

sociation member] after negotiations commence might well lead to a
breakdown of the [bargaining] unit....
Multi-employer bargaining is based on the consent of the parties to
treat [sic] with one another through the agreed units.
Sheridan Creations, 357 F.2d at 247-48 (citations omitted). Similarly, the 1otor Carriers court enjoined one of the companies in a multi-employer bargaining unit from
seeking to arbitrate a dispute in a manner different from that agreed to in a collective bargaining contract signed with the union on behalf of all the companies. Motor Carriers, 226 F. Supp. at 799. The court stated that
[m]ulti-employer agreements similar to the contract in this case are
intended to promote the common economic interests of the parties and
insure industrial harmony for the period covered by the contract.
• . .This multi-employer Agreement would be meaningless and utter chaos would occur if each carrier could resort to private arbitration
[not provided for in the agreement] merely because it received an adverse decision under the procedures outlined in the contract.
Id. at 798. The dissident company in iMotor Carners, like General Marine in Berman
Enterprises, had signed a confirmation of bargaining authority empowering the unit
to negotiate on its behalf. Id. at 797.
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emption under the other prongs of the test, or else find a remedy in
their labor law and common law rights.
On the other hand, by authorizing a multi-employer bargaining
association to bargain on their behalf, members of the association
may be virtually insuring fulfillment of the second prong of the nonstatutory exemption. A party to an agreement negotiated by a bargaining association will be hard put in a later action to assert that
the clauses at issue do not "primarily affect only" the plaintiff, other
constituents of the bargaining association, and the union-groups
related by the fact of collective bargaining.
3.

The "Arm's-Length Bargaining" Requirement

The third prong of the nonstatutory exemption states that
the matter at issue must be the product of bona fide, arm's-length
collective bargaining. 2 23 This prong is principally directed at restraints contained in the agreements between unions and employers. It limits the exemption to situations arising from bona
fide motives and endeavors.2 2 4
The rationale for this prong is not difficult to understand.
The exemption is not designed to clothe sweetheart contracts or
contracts that have anticompetitive designs.2 2 5 Rather, the test
protects only contracts resulting from honest, give-and-take negotiation. 226 Neither is the test designed for contracts whose
true purpose is business advantage rather than enhancement of
the workers' conditions and well-being. 22 7 This does not, of
223 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
224 Under NLRB rulings, a sine qua non of bargaining is that it be done in good
faith. See, e.g.,First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 n.12
(1981); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
225 See, e.g., National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Constructors Ass'n, 678
F.2d 492, 501 (4th Cir. 1982) (anticompetitive agreement declared illegal per se).
226 Cf.McCormick & McKinnon, ProfessionalFootball's Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 414-15 (1984). The author
notes that "the requirement of 'actual bargaining' is fraught with dangers and
should be applied only in narrowly circumscribed situations. The distinction between discussion and bargaining is too obscure to discriminate the licit from the
illicit." Id. at 414. Thus, mere posturing will not satisfy the requirement of good
faith bargaining. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). Squabbling is not necessary, however, where one
side's position is well-known and entrenched. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor
Agreements, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 109, 128-29; see also infra
note 228 and accompanying text.
227 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 668; Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809-10; International
Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 393-94
(3d Cir. 1973); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D.D.C.
1976), aff-d, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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course, mean that either side must yield from its negotiating position; all that is required is good faith bargaining. 22 8 Not even
labor law requires a change of negotiating position for bargaining to occur in good faith and at arm's length.2 2 9
The third prong is directed at agreements. It does not,
therefore, address all situations in which the antitrust labor exemption should validly arise. For example, reluctant employer
conduct resulting from union pressure and coercion should not
be the subject of antitrust liability.2"' As discussed below, the
third prong should be read to assure that employers who bend to
the will or power of the union through necessity are not unfairly
penalized for seeking their own economic self-preservation.
Given the often prohibitive economic costs of a strike or other
punitive labor conduct, it is unrealistic and unfair to expect more
of employers than good faith, arm's-length conduct.
A prime example of the application of the third prong in its
usual collective bargaining context is Mackey v. National Football
League.231 The National Football League had included a clause,
"the Rozelle Rule," in its bargaining agreement with the players'
union, allowing the football commissioner to award compensation to a team that lost a free agent player to another team.2 3 2
The Rozelle Rule, however, had not been bargained over by the
2 3 It was simply added to the contract and, in effect,
parties. 23
decreed by Commissioner Pete Rozelle.2 34 The Eighth Circuit held
that the absence of "bona fide arm's-length bargaining" over the
clause took it outside the purview of the antitrust exemption.23
228 McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1200 (6th Cir. 1979); see

also Comment, The Labor-Management Context, supra note 164, at 389-90 (nonstatutory exemption does not protect sham collective bargaining agreements).
229 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1952); NLRB v.
Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1978); Wal-Lite Div.
of United States Gypsum Co. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 108, 112 (8th Cir. 1973); NLRB v.
United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120, 125-26 (6th Cir. 1955).
230 See, e.g., lodice v. Calabrese, 512 F.2d 383, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1975); Webb v.
Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973); East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 568, 163 F.2d 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1947); New Broadcasting Co. v. Kehoe, 94 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). But seeJamesJulian,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,236, at 67,005-06 (D. Del.)
(union coercion does not immunize employer from antitrust liability). See generally
infra notes 301-327 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of this subject).
231 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
232 Id. at 609 n. .
233 Id. at 610-11.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 616. The court stated that "[t]he policy favoring collective bargaining is
furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the
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The requirement of good faith bargaining has been criticized
on the ground that it thrusts the courts into the collective bargaining process, forcing them to weigh complex bargaining positions on matters requiring a special understanding of the
particular industry involved.23 6 This criticism, however, is largely
groundless. Evaluating whether a party has taken a bona fide position in the context of a bargaining relationship need not require a court to second-guess the negotiators or determine if
their bargaining positions were reasonable. 2 7 Rather, the court
must perform a good faith analysis and investigate the circumstances in order to convince itself that genuine, bona fide bargaining occurred.
The third prong should not be misread to require that the
parties negotiate furiously over every clause of a collective bargaining agreement. Some clauses are obviously valid subjects of
such an agreement. The third prong addresses clauses that impose questionable requirements resulting in restraints on nonlabor competition.23 8 It is in that context that it should be applied.
IV.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

FROM THE

EMPLOYER'S PERSPECTIVE

The foregoing discussion highlighted the major ambiguities
and anomalies in the antitrust labor exemption with a view toward enabling employers to assess the antitrust implications of
labor-related conduct. Analysis of the practical problems confronting employers, however, merely begins at this point. This
article will now turn to a more in-depth assessment of these
problems.
A.

Most Favored Nations and Affiliates Clauses

"Affiliates clauses" like that in Berman Enterprises have an employers' analogue that is often important in the bargaining process-the "most favored nations clause." This clause binds the
union to alter its agreement with an employer to give the emagreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining." Id. at 614; see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (professional football draft violated antitrust laws under the rule of reason).
236 See, e.g., Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75, at 270 n.192.
237 The courts perform that type of analysis in other contexts. See, e.g., Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (business judgment rule); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney,
Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (same).
238 See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text.
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ployer the benefit of any more favorable terms that the union
thereafter negotiates or agrees to in collective bargaining agreements with the company's competitors.2 3 9 Just as the affiliates
clause is designed to assure that the union's hard-won achieve2 4
ments are not lost in the intricacies of corporate organization, 1
the most favored nations clause seeks to assure an employer that
its good faith and often reluctant concessions do not become
merely the floor from which its competitors achieve a better
deal.2 4 ' Most favored nations clauses can also help unions by
providing a reasonable basis for them to resist inadequate offers
and proposals in subsequent negotiations with other employers.
Criticism of these clauses dates back to Pennington.24 2 It surfaced again in 1975 as a result of the Supreme Court's backhanded condemnation of them in Connell.2 4 3 The few decisions
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 932-33; accord King & Smith, supra note
144, at 955-56.
241 See Associated Milk Dealers v. Milk Drivers Union Local 753, 422 F.2d 546,
553-54 (7th Cir. 1970). See generally Case Comment, Antitrust Law: Most Favored Nation Clause and Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 19J. PUB. L. 399 (1970).
242 In Pennington, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the union and the
employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain about the wages,
hours and working conditions of other bargaining units or to attempt to
settle these matters for the entire industry. On the contrary, the duty to
bargain unit by unit leads to a quite different conclusion. The union's
obligation to its members would seem best served if the union retained
the ability to respond to each bargaining situation as the individual circumstances might warrant, without being strait-jacketed by some prior
agreement with the favored employers.
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666. It is clear, however, that multi-employer bargaining
associations themselves are proper and violate neither labor nor antitrust law. See,
e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 502 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Signatory Negotiating Comm. v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
447 F. Supp. 1384, 1391 (D. Colo. 1978). This is a sensible rule, which is necessary
in a competitive industry. The rule enables businesses to counter the power of big
labor, which often represents the entire workforce of all of the employer's
competitors.
243 In Connell, the Court stated:
The "most favored nation" clause in the multiemployer agreement
promised to eliminate competition between members of the Association
and any other subcontractors that Local 100 might organize. By giving
members of the Association a contractual right to insist on terms as
favorable as those given any competitor, it guaranteed that the union
would make no agreement that would give an unaffiliated contractor a
competitive advantage over members of the Association. Subcontractors in the Association thus stood to benefit from any extension of Local
100's organization, but the method Local 100 chose also had the effect
of sheltering them from outside competition in that portion of the market covered by subcontracting agreements between general contractors
239
240
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that have grappled directly with most favored nations clauses,
both under labor law and antitrust law, have upheld them as reasonable counters to industry-wide union power.2 4 4 The cases,
however, fail to address the problems that attend such clauses.
The courts have not provided employers and unions with a
reasonable set of standards to assess the legality of most favored
nations and affiliates clauses. In Signatory Negotiating Committee v.
Local 9, International Union of Operating Engineers, 245 for example,
the bargaining agent for heavy contractors in Colorado challenged parts of its agreement with the union representing operating engineers. 24 6 The district court held the agreement exempt
from antitrust challenge:
The Master Agreement contains a "most favored nation
clause." Connell did not hold that such a clause was per se an
illegal restraint of trade ...
The exemption of labor union activity and of collective
bargaining contracts from the antitrust laws is dependent
upon an analysis of the extent to which legitimate labor objectives are advanced by that which can be considered to have
anticompetitive consequences. A union and an employer in
the context of collective bargaining can reach an agreement
which will have anticompetitive effects if the primary
benefits
24 7
are to matters of wages and working conditions.
This type of reasoning may be an apt statement of the balancing
and Local 100. In that portion of the market, the restriction on subcontracting would eliminate competition on all subjects covered by the multiemployer agreement, even on subjects unrelated to wages, hours, and
working conditions.
Connell, 421 U.S. at 623-24.
244 For authority subsequent to Connell, see Signatory Negotiating Comm. v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 447 F. Supp. 1384, 1391 (D. Colo. 1978);
Hotel Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 355, 245 N.L.R.B. 774, 1979-80
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,429 (1979); Note, Labor's ATonstatutor Exemption, supra note
145, at 861 n.100.
245 447 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1978).
246

See id. at 1385-87.

Id. at 1391. In another case, the NLRB described a "most favored nations"
clause as follows:
In contrast to Pennington, the MFNC provision [most favored nation
clause] upon which the [Employer] here insisted was manifestly not an
effort to impose wages and working conditions on other employers or
employees in other bargaining units but was designed only to assure
that this Employer could be relieved of any disadvantage that it might
otherwise suffer if the Union subsequently negotiated more favorable
wage and benefit levels with other emloyers.
Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038, 1970 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
21,963, at 28,246.
247

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:4

process involved in evaluating most favored nations clauses. It fails
to provide, however, the practical guidelines from which one can
predict the legality of such clauses in the diverse situations in which
they will be sought or enforced. Yet, employers and unions require
precisely this kind of predictability when entering collective bargaining agreements containing most favored nations or affiliates clauses.
The most that can be said is that an employer must approach
such clauses with caution and recognize that inherent in them is a
risk of future antitrust liability. An ad hoc judgment under the
three-pronged test for the nonstatutory exemption must be made by
an employer's counsel throughout the negotiating process, and by
all concerned if and when a decision to enforce such clauses is
made. As with other forms of business conduct, it is reasonable for
employers to assume that courts will weigh the degree of anticompetitive purpose and effect, as well as the extent to which the clause
resulted from legitimate areas of union concern or employer labor
concern.
In most instances, a most favored nations clause will be less restrictive and more reasonable than a union's affiliates clause. If
properly drawn, it will be limited to the union's and employer's legitimate sphere of interest-other employers in direct competition
in the same marketplace with the contracting employer. An affiliates
clause, however, may well stretch beyond the immediate marketplace and, as in ConneU, directly limit or impede competition beyond
corresponding legitimate union objectives. 24 8 An affiliates clause in
a multi-employer agreement may unwittingly affect companies who
are in other markets or locations and whose employees are only tangentially in competition with the bargaining union.
Moreover, an affiliates clause may unfairly enmesh employers in
internecine union competition. 249 An employer who has signed
good faith collective bargaining agreements with different unions or
even different locals of the same union may inadvertantly find itself
in violation of its union contracts by virtue of an affiliates clause. An
employer may also become the object of disrupting jurisdictional
union disputes, which are not of its making and which are inappropriate in light of its record of constructive labor relations conduct.
248 As a general proposition, affiliates clauses have been held to be legal and consistent with labor law by the NLRB and the courts. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
249, See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 515 (1977); Local
644, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1136, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
NLRB v.Joint Council of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 28 (9th Cir. 1964); NLRB
v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753, 335 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir. 1964).
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Affiliates clauses may also thrust the union on workers who do not
wish it or do not even wish to be unionized, thereby depriving them
of their right to select or reject organized status.2 50 Where, as in
Berman Enterprises, the effects of such a clause are not challenged on
these or similar grounds, an affiliates clause may withstand the test
of antitrust analysis.251 In other contexts, however, these criticisms
of such clauses could lead to contrary results.
B.

The Effect of Labor Law and Labor Law Determinations

The weight of authority requires the courts in a labor antitrust action to look initially to labor law in order to determine the
legality of the conduct.2 52 That only begins the inquiry, however;
even if illegal under labor law, the conduct at issue may be accorded exemption under antitrust law.2 5 3 Nevertheless, the
courts do not agree on the role that labor law decisions play,
either as to the effect of a finding that the conduct at issue violates labor law, or as to the weight to be given to such a finding in
determining whether that conduct still falls within the nonstatutory exemption. Conversely, it is not necessarily true that conduct which is legal under labor law will be exempt from antitrust
prosecution.254
250 See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,
736-39 (1961); Union De Tronquistas, Local 901 v. Arlook, 586 F.2d 872, 877 (1st
Cir. 1978); NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 532 F.2d 902, 907
(3d Cir. 1976); Sperry Sys. Management Div. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63, 67-69 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 401 F. Supp. 370, 375-77 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Labor law requires that the
NLRB resolve disputed questions of representation. See Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
251 If such a clause is to be justified as a legitimate method of work preservation,
it must pass the Supreme Court's recent two-pronged test:
[A] lawful work preservation agreement must pass two tests: First, it
must have as its objective the preservation of work traditionally performed by employees represented by the union. Second, the contracting
employer must have the power to give the employees the work in question-the so-called "right of control" test ...
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490, 504 (1980). The
agreement may not seek recognition of the union by another employer rather than
work preservation. See Danielson v. International Org. of Masters, 521 F.2d 747,
752-53 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 486 F.2d 907, 913 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
252 MackeY, 543 F.2d at 615; see Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 688-90.
253 See, e.g.,
Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 933, 935-37; see also Commerce Tankers
Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1977) (priorjudi-

cial determination of labor law question does not necessarily determine antitrust
issue).
254 Gigliotti Corp. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,992 (E.D. Pa.). As the Gigiotti court noted, "[a]lthough a finding that a
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Where the legality under labor law of particular conduct has
already been passed upon by the NLRB or by the courts, the antitrust analysis is somewhat predictable. Although not necessarily
binding, the findings of the NLRB will generally be given collateral estoppel effect in determining whether the conduct violates
antitrust law. 255 That collateral estoppel effect is even more cogent where a court has initially analyzed the legality of the conduct under labor law. There are generally two questions in this
regard: (1) To what extent are the issues and findings in the labor law proceeding identical to the issues and findings in the antitrust proceeding? (2) Were
the findings in question essential to
256
determination?
prior
the
Some commentators have criticized the application of collateral estoppel to labor antitrust cases, particularly where the labor
law analysis came in an administrative decision. They argue that
such a methodology could ultimately affect the way the NLRB
decides its cases and may be otherwise disruptive of NLRB proceedings.25 7 Other authorities, however, have argued that there
particular agreement is protected by the labor laws may not conclusively exempt
the agreement from liability under the antitrust laws . . .such a finding argues
strongly for antitrust exemption." Id. at 68,386 (citation omitted); see Consolidated
Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 518 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).
255 Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ., 715 F.2d 21, 26-27 (2d Cir.
1983); International Wire v. Local 38, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 475 F.2d 1078,
1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); see also United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (res judicata applies to administrative
determinations); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844-45 &
n.10 (3d Cir. 1974) (collateral estoppel effect given to judicial decision upholding
agreement under labor law); cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 33031 (1979) (unavailability of discovery in administrative proceeding sometimes allows later relitigation of issues). But see Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 751 F.2d 653, 661-62 (3d Cir. 1985) (collateral estoppel effect denied where party against whom it is sought "had no control over the factual and
legal issues tried before the NLRB"). On the other hand, the mere pendency of an
NLRB labor proceeding will not divest the courts of jurisdiction to determine an
antitrust action arising out of the same conduct. Telecom Plus, Inc. v. Local 3, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 719 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1983).
256 RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social Servs., 684 F.2d 192, 197 (2d Cir.
1982). For this reason, an NLRB decision is clearly binding on a later claim of
violation of § 303 of the Taft-Hartley/Landrum-Griffin Acts, but less clearly on antitrust claims. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ., 715 F.2d 21, 26-27
(2d Cir. 1983).
257 See, e.g., Comment, Consolidated Express, supra note 12, at 652 n.48. The author
of that comment observes that
[t]hese cases should make the collateral estoppel consequences of
NLRB rulings foreseeable and therefore induce aggressive litigation.
This aggressiveness, however, may infect NLRB proceedings with dilatory and issue-broadening tactics. Moreover, the attachment of antitrust
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is no legal reason to disregard such administrative decisions
where the prerequisites of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
met. 2 5 8 The latter view seems to be the more persuasive, provided, of course, that careful inquiry is made into the full circumstances of the prior administrative proceeding to assure that it
was fully and fairly litigated. In this regard, the court should determine whether the possible antitrust implications of the conduct at issue were considered by the prior forum in its
disposition of the labor law issue. Employers should not have to
hesitate in bringing good faith labor grievances to a court or the
NLRB out of fear that failure to prevail will necessarily risk treble
damage liability under the antitrust laws. Such a result would unreasonably deter and hinder enforcement of legitimate employer
rights under labor law. It would also escalate the potential significance and consequences of labor disputes to unfair and unhealthy proportions.
In any event, the collateral estoppel issue is and should be
only a starting point in analyzing the effect of labor law violations
or nonviolations on the determination of the availability of the
exemption. While a prior decision may end the inquiry into
some of the issues (e.g., whether the restraint is intimately related
to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, which is aptly answered under labor law standards), inquiry should still be made
about the circumstances under which the restraint was agreed to
consequences to an NLRB order might deprive the agency of flexibility
in cases where it might believe a simple cease-and-desist order, without
consequences to the union any more serious than being ordered to stop
doing something, might be the most appropriate solution to a particular
problem.
Id.
258 See, e.g., Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75, at 273 n.202. The authors explain
their reasoning as follows:
Logically, conduct that is deemed lawful under the labor laws
should be within the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. To be sure,
union organizational activity and other concerted efforts not proscribed
by Congress should be immune from antitrust scrutiny. With respect to
the mandatory-nonmandatory dichotomy, limiting the exemption to
mandatory subjects of bargaining insures that those areas of the employer-union relationship involving mandatory subjects of bargaining
will not be subject to antitrust regulation. The NLRB has delineated
precise guidelines on mandatory bargaining subjects in an effort to promote meaningful negotiation between employers and their employees'
representatives with due regard for the business exigencies attending
such negotiation. The antitrust laws should not be invoked to disturb
these guidelines, which reflect the experience and expertise of the
NLRB.
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and the intent and expectations of the parties before the conduct
is deemed outside the protections of the exemption and violative
of antitrust law.2 5" The courts should bear in mind that their role

is to balance labor and antitrust policy; giving conclusive deference to labor law decisions would render antitrust law
subordinate to labor law.260
These same considerations apply where the labor implications of particular conduct have not yet been passed upon by the
courts or the NLRB. The determination of whether the actions at
issue are exempt from antitrust liability should not depend solely
upon labor law. 2 6 ' Rather, in deciding whether certain conduct is

exempt from antitrust liability, the courts should weigh both the
labor and the antitrust policies.262 Sound authority holds that
conduct which may initially be illegal under labor law may still
merit exemption from the antitrust laws. 263 Most recent authoriSee Comment, An Objective Standard,supra note 86, at 1292-93; see also Kirkpatrick, Crossroads of Antitrust and Union Power, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 288, 292 (1965)
(rules of collective bargaining and labor exemption both must be construed "to
redress the inequality of position and power of employer and employee").
260 See Meltzer, supra note 55, at 697-99, 731-34.
261 Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 769 F.2d
1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75, at 272-80 (arguing that the antitrust exemption should "turn exclusively on labor law principles").
262 Cf. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)
(balancing insurance regulation and antitrust regulation); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (balancing securities regulation and antitrust regulation). See generally Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of
Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
265, 267-68 (1979).
263 See, e.g., Iodice v. Calabrese, 512 F.2d 383, 388, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1975), revg
on other grounds 345 F. Supp. 248, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); East Tex. Motor Freight
Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10, 11-12 (5th Cir. 1947); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union Local 680, 308
F. Supp. 982, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); New Broadcasting Co. v. Kehoe, 94 F. Supp.
113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The court in National Dair' adopted the following
rationale:
While it is undoubtedly true that our problem involves an effort to harmonize in some measure the federal laws regulating labor relations and
those promoting competition, we doubt seriously that conduct which
could comprise an "unfair labor practice" should for that reason be
divested of the labor exemption from the antitrust laws. To put the
point more broadly, union conduct may be patently and grossly wrongful, but none the less outside the scope of Sherman Act proscriptions. . . . And this may be peculiarly true where the asserted
"illegality" is in the periodically altered and sometimes abstruse field of
unfair labor practices. In that field, union conduct definitely exempted
from the Sherman Act by the statutes defining the exemption, may in
other respects be "lawful" or not, depending upon how Congress may
choose to adjust the labor-management balance from time to time.
National Dairy, 308 F. Supp. at 987 (citations omitted); accord Zifchak, supra note
259
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ties, however, favor the contrary result. They argue that it would
be anomalous to accord conduct that is illegal under labor law an
exemption from antitrust liability on the theory that the conduct
2 64
furthers labor law policy.
The most thoughtful analysis of the significance of a finding
of labor law legality in a pending antitrust action comes from the
Conex litigation in the Third Circuit. In Consolidated Express, Inc. v.
New York ShippingAssociation, 265 the court created a distinction between claims for treble damages under the antitrust laws and
claims for injunctive relief.2 66 Under this approach, a finding that
labor law has been violated will necessarily strip the matter of the
exemption in connection with a claim for an injunction under the
antitrust laws. 2 6 7 At the same time, however, a "limited" antitrust labor exemption would still exist in claims for damages if
"the parties reasonably believed that their agreement was
'directly related' to" lawful labor matters. 268 The court's reasons
for allowing a limited exemption when damages are sought are
worth repeating:
[Antitrust law] provides both parties to the bargaining process
with a strong incentive to take into account in their negotiations the public interest in competition in the secondary marketplace. . . . But the question remains how much antitrust
incentive is necessary to encourage the parties to the collective
bargaining process to take into account anticompetitive injury
to secondary parties. One possible answer is that the § 16 injunctive remedy, coupled with § 303 damage remedy against
the union, and the NLRB's unfair labor practice jurisdiction is
all the incentive that is required. We think not, however, for
while those remedies may provide strong incentive for unions
not to make excessive secondary demands, they provide very
little incentive to employers to resist such demands. Employ185, at 373; Comment, Consolidated Express, supra note 12, at 655-56. Conversely, it
has been held that the mere fact that the conduct is held legal under labor law does
not mandate its exemption from the antitrust laws. Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v.
Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 769 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).
264 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 518-19
(3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); accord Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75,
at 272-73; Gibbons, supra note 174, at 246 & n. 148; King & Moser, supra note 53, at
104-05; see Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 & n. 12; cf. Feather v. United Mine Workers, 711
F.2d 530, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing Consolidated Express but finding no antitrust liability for illegal labor activity).
265 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

Conex].
266

Id. at 519.

267

Id.

268

Id. at 519-20.
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ers may have no predatory purpose against secondary targets,
but may nevertheless be quite willing to sacrifice in the bargaining process the interests of those targets in exchange for
concessions on other bargaining issues. Since employers are
not liable for damages under § 303, the only risk they would
run from overwilling acquiescence in a bargained for § 8(e)
violation would be that either in a § 10(1) or § 16 injunctive
action they would be made to stop. That would give employers
the best of all possible worlds at the collective bargaining table, since they would keep the benefit of the concessions bargained for on other issues, while the risk of economic injury to
secondary targets would be2 6 borne
by those targets and an
9
often shallow pocket union.
It is true, as the Conex court observed, that employers could be
unduly favored if the labor exemption were completely abolished.
Nevertheless, other considerations militate in favor of giving the labor law determination only prima facie weight. Some employers
agree, in good faith and with reasonable expectations that they are
doing so legally, to clauses that are later held to violate the labor
laws. Some are also compelled by superior union bargaining power
to accede to questionable clauses without any improper business
motive and with no resulting benefit to them. Consequently, the
Conex court crafted an appropriate set of standards for the limited
nonstatutory exemption in antitrust damage cases. 27" To fit within
that exemption, the defendant has the burden of proving that the
following elements existed at the time of the agreement:
(a) the defendant "could not reasonably have foreseen
that the subject matter of the agreement being challenged
would be held . . . unlawful";
(b) the "steps taken to implement [the agreement] were
'intimately related' to the object of collective bargaining
thought at the time to be legitimate"; and
(c) those steps "went no further in imposing restraints
in the secondary market than was reasonably necessary to accomplish" the objective.2 71
Thus, Conex essentially established an ad hoc approach, allowing
employers and unions to retain the protections of the nonstatutory
labor exemption if they have proceeded in a manner reasonably be261)
270

Id. at 520.
Cf. Gibbons, supra note 174, at 246 (Conex created an "unprecedented affirma-

tive defense").
271

Conex, 602 F.2d at 521; see also Feather v. United Mine Workers, 711 F.2d 530,

542 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing and applying the Conex test).
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lieved to be consistent with labor law and without predatory intent
or effect. This is a realistic and fair approach to a difficult problem.
Actually, the Conex test is not a far departure from the threepronged test found in the weight of authority on the nonstatutory
exemption. Therefore, the controversy Conex has evoked 27 2 appears
to be inappropriate. This does not mean, however, that the decision
is insignificant. On the contrary, Conex represents a new and constructive attempt to draft practical guidelines for the antitrust labor
exemption. The Conex test is tailored to the confusing realities of the
collective bargaining environment.
To date, the Federal courts outside the Third Circuit have not
passed upon Conex. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the
"limited" antitrust labor exemption will become the rule in other
Federal jurisdictions, or whether it will act as a catalyst for a general
rethinking of the current three-pronged test for the nonstatutory
exemption.
Aside from Conex, there is relatively little recent authority on the
weight to be given to a finding of illegality under labor law. The
only other appellate decision directly on point is Commerce Tankers
Corp. v. National Maritime Union,27 3 in which the Second Circuit refused to hold that a finding of illegality under labor law will necessarily mean the loss of the nonstatutory exemption.- 74 The court,
however, failed to lay out the reasons for its conclusion. Moreover,
because the case antedated Conex, the court did not comment on
that decision.
The Second Circuit's summary disposition of the proper weight
to be given to a labor law violation does not mean that there is no
discernible rationale for the rule espoused in Commerce Tankers.
There is, and it cannot be dismissed out of hand. Essentially, the
rationale is based upon Congress's deliberate refusal in the past to
legislate affirmatively that labor law violations are also antitrust violations in labor antitrust cases. When Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act, it was also asked to provide for treble damage
272 Compare King & Moser, supra note 53, at 101-16 (analyzing impact of Conex)
with Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75, at 264-68 (criticizing Conex) and Comment,
Consolidated Express, supra note 12, at 655-63 (same).
273 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
274 Id. at 801-02. The court stated: "We do not believe that our prior holding that
the clause violated § 8(e) [of the National Labor Relations Act] necessarily determines [the] antitrust issue, although it lends support to [the plaintiffs'] position."
Id.; cf. Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 769
F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (court concluded that finding of labor law legality
did not conclusively establish antitrust exemption).
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recovery under labor law for illegal secondary boycotts. 7 5 Needless
to say, Congress refused to do SO. 2 7 6 It recognized that it would be
counterproductive to impose deterrents upon the collective bargaining process by holding the club of punitive treble liability over
the heads of good faith negotiators. 277 By precluding the automatic
loss of the exemption for an error in determining the lawful limits of
labor law, Congress meant to encourage agreements that cautious
negotiators might otherwise fear to make.
Given this rationale, Commerce Tankers is not directly at odds
with Conex. Conex also seeks to encourage collective bargaining by
expressly adopting the concept that one will not face treble damages
for good faith and reasonable negotiating decisions. 27" That it provides otherwise for injunctive actions merely assures that illegal conduct will not be permitted to continue, a policy that is hard to
quarrel with and which does not contradict Congress's intentions. 271 Surely Congress did not intend that violations of its labor
laws continue unabated merely because of special policies under the
antitrust laws.2 8 °
Conex, therefore, represents a reasonable balance of the concerns underlying labor law and antitrust law. It provides, in effect, a
good faith defense to any monetary antitrust recovery where a labor
law violation has occurred. The fact that the conduct at issue is not
exempt from the antitrust laws, however, does not, without more,
mandate a finding that it constitutes an antitrust violation. Having
determined that the antitrust labor exemption does not apply, the
courts must then turn to traditional antitrust analysis in order to
275 See 105 CONG. REC. 15,532-35 (1959) (statement of Rep. Alger); see also Connell, 421 U.S. at 652-53 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (summarizing Rep. Alger's attempt
to include antitrust-type liability provisions in the Landrum-Griffin Act).
276 See Taft-Hartley Act § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1982).
277 Comment, Consolidated Express, supra note 12, at 656. The author notes that
"automatic imposition of antitrust treble damages would burden collective bargaining by limiting the ways in which labor and management can reconcile their competing interests." Id.
278 See Conex, 602 F.2d at 521; see also Connell, 421 U.S. at 650-55 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (explaining background of Landrum-Griffin Act); Comment, Consolidated
Express, supra note 12, at 655-57 (criticizing Conex, but noting that availability of
antitrust damages would hinder collective bargaining); cf. Gibbons, supra note 174,
at 246 (court's action in Conex was "unprecedented").
279 The core question is which laws should redress such violations. Labor advocates seek to remit plaintiffs solely to their labor law remedies for redress. See, e.g.,
Zifchak, supra note 185, at 373. Conex, however, reasonably declined to risk that
such conduct would continue unabated if it also violated antitrust law.
280 It should be remembered, however, that the Taft-Hartley Act also provides
for possible injunctions. National Labor Relations Act § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)
(1982) (added by Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 149 (1947)).
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determine whether the challenged conduct actually establishes an
antitrust violation.2 8 '
C.

Per Se v. Rule of Reason Standards

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the proper sequence
of review in labor antitrust cases is to decide first whether the
labor exemption applies, and then, if it does not, to dispose of
the traditional antitrust questions. 2 2 This sequence, though simple to state, leaves two unresolved questions. First, no case appears to have grappled with whether the threshold
determination-the applicability of the labor exemption-is a
jury or nonjury question. Presumably, like other mixed fact and
law issues, it is ajury question. 28" Also unresolved is the issue of
the appropriate antitrust standard of review if the labor exemption is found inapplicable-the rule of reason or per se liability.
Stated differently, should labor-related cases be treated like all
other antitrust cases, or should special rules apply because of the
unique policy considerations attendant to such cases?
In antitrust cases, most forms of anticompetitive conduct are
tested under the rule of reason. This involves, "among other factors, a study of the consequences of the conduct" on the relevant
market. 8 4 Conversely, certain types of conduct are now recognized to be inherently anticompetitive: "price fixing, group boycotts, market allocation, restrictive practices involving patents,
and certain competition-preclusive conduct by monopoly
groups. '28 5 Such conduct constitutes a per se violation of the antitrust laws. 2 8 6
To date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined
whether the rule of reason or per se liability should apply to conduct in labor-related antitrust cases. Its decisions, however, suggest that there should be no special rule for labor-related
281 Note, Labor's NonstatutorY Exemption, supra note 145, at 876; see Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 61 & n.19 (1978).
282 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611, 616; Note, Labor's NonstatutorV Exemption, supra note
145, at 876; see Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 61
(1978).
283 In Berman Enterprises, the court ruled on the labor exemption issues on a motion for directed verdict. See Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 932. Nevertheless,
there may well be enough of a factual dispute to allow other cases to go to the jury,
particularly on issues of intent and purpose.
284 George R. Whitten,Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 559
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
285 Id. (citations omitted).
286, Id.
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cases. 2
The circuit courts have split on the question, with the
First, Third, and Fourth Circuits endorsing the possibility of per
se liability, 288 and the Second and Eighth suggesting that the rule
of reason should apply in all labor antitrust cases. 28 9 The Ninth
and District of Columbia Circuits, while having applied the rule
of reason, appear to have left open the possibility of per se treatment in other cases.2 90
The argument for applying the rule of reason in labor-related antitrust cases is premised on one of two policy considerations: (a) the competition between employees and the
relationship between workers and employers are materially different from the competition and relationship between competitor
''te1
employers, 291 or (b)
the balance to be struck between antitrust
law and labor law is so complex that an ad hoc evaluation process, rather than rigid determinations of liability, is necessary lest
the court peremptorily undercut Federal labor policy. 29 2 Among
the advocates of this approach are several leading antitrust experts, including Professor Milton Handler.2 9 3
287 In Apex, the Court intimated that there is no distinction between labor and
nonlabor cases. See Apex, 310 U.S. at 487-89. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), however, the Court expressly distinguished combinations with "commercial objectives" from those of "labor unions, which normally
have other objectives." Id. at 213 n.7.
288 National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Constructors Ass'n, 678 F.2d
492, 501 (4th Cir. 1982); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
640 F.2d 1368, 1380 (1st Cir. 1981), afd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 212 (1982);
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 522-23 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). The Sixth Circuit appears to agree. See
James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 677 F.2d 1111, 1120 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982). But see Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern
Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir.)(cautioning
"against mechanical or imprudent application of the per se rule in the labor context"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
289 Berman Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 936-37; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620; see also Commerce Tankers, 553 F.2d at 801 (noting that substantial question exists regarding
applicable analysis).
290 Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484,
490-92 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
291 Comment, The Labor-ManagementContext, supra note 164, at 396-97; see Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
292 See Commerce Tankers, 553 F.2d at 801-02.
293 See Handler, supra note 88, at 239-40. Professor Handler advocates the following approach:
This brings us to the question of antitrust liability when union activity is
held to be non-exempt. The principal danger of these recent rulings is
that a finding of antitrust liability will automatically be made whenever
the challenged conduct is held to be non-exempt. This would be a per se
approach with a vengeance. Arrangements may fall outside the scope of
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The opposite view is that the labor exemption itself should
provide the only special treatment for labor-related antitrust actions. Since a court only reaches the question of antitrust liability
if it first finds that the labor exemption is unavailable, there can
be no justification for further special treatment based merely
upon the labor-related nature of the case. Indeed, to give special
treatment to the conduct at that point on the grounds of labor
law policy is to repeat much-if not all-of the same analysis that
was just completed in deciding that the labor exemption did not
apply.

2 94

The latter view is the more persuasive. This does not mean,
however, that all nonexempt labor-related cases will automatically become per se antitrust violations; it only means that such
cases will be given no special treatment one way or the other.
Most anticompetitive conduct will still be analyzed under the rule
of reason; only price fixing, group boycotts, and other classic
market distortion techniques will compel the invocation of per se
antitrust liability. Indeed, if the situation properly calls for the
rule of reason test under traditional antitrust analysis, duplication of much of the analysis previously performed in deciding
whether the nonstatutory labor exemption applied will be inevitable. 295 Therefore, given the limited nature of per se violamandatory bargaining and yet have no adverse effect on competition.
We still must find whether the agreement restrains trade and whether
the restraint is unreasonable. A fair reading ofJewel Tea satisfies me that
the Court intended that there be a full-scale rule of reason inquiry in
every instance in which a non-exempt activity is claimed to be in violation of antitrust.
Id. at 239-40; accord Casey & Cozzillio, supra note 75, at 278.
294 The Conex court explained that
[t]he justification offered for application of the rule of reason is the need
to recognize, in the antitrust context, labor's legitimate interest in the
collective bargaining process. That interest, however, is precisely the
same one that must be taken into account in determining the scope of
the nonstatutory labor exemption. A holding that the exemption does
not apply embodies a judgment that considerations of labor policy are
outweighed by the anticompetitive dangers posed by the challenged restraint. The proposed use of the rule of reason would, therefore, simply
be an invitation to the court or jury to reweigh under a different label
the question of the non-statutory exemption.
Conex, 602 F.2d at 523-24; see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133, 136 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting the relationship
between labor policy underlying the nonstatutory exemption and traditional rule of
reason analysis); cf. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1238-39 (2d Cir. 1975)
(perse rule provides more certainty than rule of reason), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053
(1976).
2 )5 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
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tions" 6 and the decided trend toward dealing with antitrust matters under the rule of reason, 2'1 7 there seems little risk of oppression or injustice from allowing matters that are not covered by
the labor exemption to be tested under traditional antitrust
analysis.
From the employer's standpoint, allowing labor-related antitrust cases to be judged under traditional antitrust analysis seems
fair, and indeed preferable to an across-the-board rule of reason
analysis. The plaintiff employer is entitled to the ordinary protections that attend a purely commercial antitrust action. Having
cleared the hurdle of the labor exemption, it would be unfair to
subject the plaintiff to another artificial and duplicative hurdle.
690 (1978); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 570-72 (5th Cir. 1978); Admiral
Theatre Corp. v. Douglass Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1294 (D. Neb. 1977);
see also Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
(factfinder must weigh all circumstances of case). In Smith, the court explained:
Under the rule of reason, a restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect. In
making this evaluation, a court generally will be required to analyze "the
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed." If, on analysis, the restraint is found to have
legitimate business purposes whose realization serves to promote competition, the "anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be
carefully balanced against its "procompetitive virtues" to ascertain
whether the former outweigh the latter. A restraint is unreasonable if it
has the "net effect" of substantially impeding competition.
Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183 (footnotes omitted); see also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (only unreasonable restraints are invalid); Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (reasonable restraints are consistent with antitrust law).
296 Per se treatment is only accorded restrictive practices that are so innately anticompetitive that they leave no doubt about their unreasonable nature. Worthen
Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bankamericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-25 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); see, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596 (1972) (market division); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S.
207 (1959) (group boycott); Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (concerted refusal to deal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing). As explained in National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Constructors Ass'n, 678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982),
[tihe critical analysis in determining whether a particular activity constitutes a per se violation is whether the activity on its face seems to be
such that it would always or almost always restrict competition and decrease output instead of being designed to increase economic efficiency
and make the market more rather than less competitive.
Id. at 500. But cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1,
23 (1979) (not all agreements impacting on price are per se unlawful).
2)7 See supra note 295 and accompanying text. This is consistent with the other
trends limiting antitrust standing and liability. See supra notes I I & 150 and accompanying text.
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On the defense side, unions and competitor employers who have
engaged in conduct outside of the antitrust labor exemption have
no logical entitlement to greater protections on any theory linked
to labor law policy. Defendant employers will not be prejudiced
by this approach, particularly if the good faith prong and the
Conex test continue to be part of the determination of the nonstatutory exemption's applicability. The only time such defendant
employers will face a per se antitrust violation is where their conduct has been deliberate and pernicious, thereby warranting- no
sympathy from the courts or from legal theoreticians.
D.

Coercion of Employers

Labor antitrust complaints are generally rooted in the ongoing struggle between unions and management rather than in the
competition between employers in any given market. Faced with
the threat of a strike, or as the result of a strike or boycott, management may relent to union pressure and reluctantly enter into
an agreement or terminate arrangements it would not otherwise
enter into or terminate. Such situations have provoked both outsiders 29 8 and employers themselves 299 to complain of antitrust
and labor law violations.3 0°
This coercion aspect of the bargaining process raises two
questions of prime importance to employers: (1) Can bending to
the will of the union be deemed a contract, combination, or conspiracy within the prohibitions of section 1 or-where applicable-section 2 of the Sherman Act? (2) Should the employer's
reluctance provide an added defense if the resulting conduct falls
outside of the labor exemption? As with everything else regarding the labor exemption, these questions have not been answered
with a simple "yes" or "no."
Earlier nonlabor cases held that a reluctant combination is
still a combination for antitrust purposes."' Recent authority,
however, appears to frown on such a hard and fast rule.30 2 The
298 See, e.g., Bermian Enterprises, 644 F.2d at 932-34.
299 See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 619-21.
300 See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text; see, e.g.,

Altemose Constr. Co.
v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d 653, 654 (3d Cir. 1985); Richards v.
Nielsen Freight Lines, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,522, at 65,586 (E.D. Cal.).
301 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939); see also United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 n.6 (1960) (agreement violative of
Sherman Act can be "express, tacit or implied").
'302See, e.g., Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir.
1982), aff'd on reh g en bane, 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983); accord EdwardJ. Sweeney
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Supreme Court has made clear that section 1 of the Sherman Act
requires "a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective. ' 30 3 This stricter requirement has been the rule in the majority of labor antitrust
cases for several years, on the theory that an unwilling employer
does not have such a conscious commitment. 4 Nevertheless,
some courts even today continue to rule to the contrary in labor
cases. They seek to impose an affirmative duty on employers to
resist union pressure, particularly where that pressure is
designed to involve them in questionable arrangements or
agreements.35
The case of Iodice v. Calabrese30 6 demonstrates the general
rule that accession to union pressure does not create a conspir& Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
(1981); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 946 (1978).
303 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1471 (1984)
(quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). This actually represents a return to language used by the Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946). American Tobacco held that in order to establish a conspiracy, the factual
circumstances must show "a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement." Id. at 810. This "common
understanding" may, of course, be "drawn from circumstantial evidence." C & K
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,830, at 72,134
(W.D. Pa.). In Monsanto, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he correct standard [of
proof] is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action. . . .That is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that
reasonably tends to prove. . .a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective." Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1473. The
Supreme Court also recognized, however, that under some circumstances, coerced
agreements can be sufficient combinations, conspiracies, or agreements to give rise
to Sherman Act liability. See id. at 1471 n.9.
304 See, e.g.,
Iodice v. Calabrese, 512 F.2d 383, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'g on
othergrounds 345 F. Supp. 248, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306,
308 (4th Cir. 1973); Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 888 (2d Cir. 1970); East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 568, 163 F.2d 10, 11-12 (5th Cir. 1947);
Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1301, 1309-10 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); New Broadcasting Co. v. Kehoe, 94 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
see also Hunt, 325 U.S. at 823-24 (agreement among laborers not a violation of Sherman Act); Cedar Crest Hats, Inc. v. United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers Int'l
Union, 362 F.2d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 1966) (insufficient evidence of secondary boycott by workers).
305 James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,236, at
67,006 (D. Del.); see also Conex, 602 F.2d at 520 (employers should resist illegal
union demands).
306 512 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1975), revg on othergrounds 345 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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acy.3 7 In Iodice, a group of independent truckers proved that several of their customers had ceased dealing with the independents'
after the truckers' union threatened to strike those customers and
impose other sanctions against them if they continued to give
business to the plaintiffs. 3 0 8 The district court specifically "found
that the pressure exerted [by the union] on contractors dealing
with Iodice was intended to force them to cease doing business
with Iodice. ' ' 30 9 As a result, the union was held liable under the
Taft-Hartley Act.3 0 The plaintiffs' antitrust claims were dismissed, however, because they had failed to show that the union
and the employers had combined or conspired to restrain commerce as required under the Sherman Act. 1 '
Representative of the opposite result is James Juian, Inc. v.
Raytheon Co. 31 2 In that case, the plaintiff entered into an agreement to do subcontracting work at a solid waste disposal plant. 13
At a meeting between the plant contractor, union officials, and
other companies, the union threatened to disrupt the construction unless Julian was dropped as a subcontractor. 3 4 When Ju307 See id. at 390-91; see also Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 1985-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,522, at 65,597-98 (E.D. Cal.) (accession to coercion by several employers is not "conscious parallelism" within antitrust law).
308 Iodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248, 253-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 512 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1975).
309 lodice, 512 F.2d at 387.
310 Id.; cf. Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d
653 (3d Cir. 1985). InAltemose, the Third Circuit suggested that union coercion not
violative of the labor laws might still be found to violate the antitrust laws where the
other prerequisites of the labor exemption were not proven by the defendants. See
id. at 661-62.
311 lodice, 512 F.2d at 390-91; accord East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 568, 163 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947). In East Texas
,4otor Freight, a group of freight carriers refused to do business with the plaintiff at
the request of the Teamsters during a labor dispute between the union and the
plaintiff. Id. at 11. The court held that "[it clearly appeared that the carriers had
not acted in conspiracy either with the union or with each other but each, as
pleaded by it, had separately acceded to the demands of the union because, and
only because, they wished to avoid labor troubles with it." Id.; see also Webb v.
Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973) (no conspiracy where companies "bowed
to . . . union pressure" and "reluctantly terminated their contracts with Webb at
the union's insistence"). This is, in effect, a corollary of the rule that mere refusals
by employers to deal with another company do not give rise to or prove a conspiracy. See, e.g., National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953,
959 (2d Cir. 1978).
312 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,236 (D. Del.); see alsoJamesJulian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 557 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Del. 1983) (prior motion in same case); James
Julian, Inc. v.Raytheon Co., 499 F. Supp. 949 (D. Del. 1980) (same).
'11'4 James Julian, Inc. v.Raytheon Co., 499 F. Supp. 949, 952-53 (D. Del. 1980).
'314 Id. at 953.
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Drivers
and occupants of vehicles were threatened, windows were broken, tires were slashed, and several persons were physically assaulted by union pickets. 16 The pickets also vandalized a crane
and four pieces of Julian's heavy equipment.3 17 Julian finally relented and left the job. 3 1i With the union's blessing, the defend3t 9
ant companies stepped in to finish Julian's work.
Julian subsequently brought its grievance to court for resolution. 32 On the union's motion for summary judgment, the court
held that there were triable issues of fact under the Sherman Act,
the Taft-Hartley Act, and state tort law. 32 ' The defendant companies, the court reasoned, had a duty "to resist illegal union demands even at the cost of a strike. ' 32 2 The court also stated that
"it is irrelevant for antitrust purposes whether Raytheon entered
32 3
the agreement [with the union] happily or grudgingly.
Julian answers both questions on the coercion issue in harsh,
traditional antitrust terms: a reluctant combination or agreement
is still a combination or agreement, and the fact that the combination "may have been produced by coercion, does not immunize it from antitrust liability." 3 2 4 Julian also held that "predatory
intent" is not required in a labor case to establish an antitrust
claim; resulting anticompetitive effects may in themselves
suffice. 3 2 5
315
316

Id.
Id.

317

Id.

Id. at 954.
See id.
Id. at 952.
Julian, 1984-2 Trade Cas. at 67,003. Julian agreed to a settlement with the
nonunion defendants. Id. at 67,002.
322 Id. at 67,006 (quoting Conex, 602 F.2d at 520). The court relied heavily on the
Third Circuit's opinion in Conex:
Employers are not, after all, without remedies against illegal demands. They can refuse to bargain and the Board will, we must presume, sustain that refusal to bargain. They can accede to the union
demand, and then sue, as Jewel Tea Company and Connell Construction Company did, to invalidate the agreement under federal law. Or
they can simply refuse to implement the agreement, once adopted, because it is in violation of § 8(e). . . . [A]ffirmative obligations imposed
by nonlabor federal [legislation] may on occasion require an employer
to resist illegal union demands even at the cost of a strike.
Id. (quoting Conex, 602 F.2d at 520).
323 Id.
'324 Id.; cf. Connell, 421 U.S. at 638 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (union immune from
antitrust liability unless it affirmatively conspires to violate Sherman Act).
325 The Juliai court explained:
318
3 19
320
321
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The holding inJulian was correct on the specific facts of the
case, but it is not necessarily right in all situations. Those facts
were, of course, quite extreme. Thus, the result was logical and
predictable. Union violence and commercial "extortion" simply
cannot be tolerated. Employers, like all citizens, cannot allow
themselves to be cajoled into assisting plainly illegal conduct
without a strong showing that they have no reasonable alternative. The Julian court, by ordering a trial, recognized that these
other alternatives must be carefully weighed before liability can
fairly be found.
In spite of their opposite results on the question of antitrust
liability, Iodice and Julian are reconcilable because they demonstrate an understanding of the realities of the bargaining process.
To require employers either to refuse to accede to the union's
pressure or to file litigation against the union to obtain an NLRB
or judicial invalidation of the union's conduct will often be unrealistic and unfair. The costs and delays of litigation may be prohibitive and self-defeating. In addition, the consequences of
employer resistance-strikes and other retaliatory action by the
union-may be too portentous, especially in a weak industry or
for a marginally successful company. This is not to say that there
are no circumstances under which conduct resulting from coercion can or should be the basis of antitrust liability. Rather, such
liability should be predicated upon conscious and willful combinations among unions and employers. These situations should
be carefully scrutinized, and liability should be found only where
the employers did not act reasonably and in good faith.
In any case, the true wrongdoer in coercion situations will
generally be the union. The Taft-Hartley Act is designed to deal
with such improper coercion, and will usually be the appropriate
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Pennington has generally been
interpreted as requiring proof of predatory intent where the challenged
agreement concerns "subjects at the 'very heart' of the collective bargaining process." ... A different analysis, however, has been applied in
other contexts. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained in
Conex, the Supreme Court in Connell abandoned the intent requirement
of Pennington. Where an agreement entered into outside of the collective
bargaining context imposes a "direct restraint on the business market"
with anticompetitive effects not flowing "naturally from the elimination
of competition over wages and working conditions," predatory intent is
irrelevant.
Julian, 1984-2 Trade Cas. at 67,008 (citations omitted); see supra notes 265-280 and
accompanying text (in a labor context, parties' intent should be investigated and
given weight as one of several considerations permitting a limited, good faith defense to employers).
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vehicle to do so. 3 2'6 The Act applies only to unions, however, and
has its own set of rules.3 27 Therefore, there is both a need and
room for antitrust liability where employers accede to union
pressure unnecessarily, unreasonably, and in bad faith.
To deal appropriately with these situations, it is recommended that the courts grant employers sued in union coercion
cases a qualified affirmative defense to treble damage claims.
Specifically, employers should be absolved from liability if they
326 Section 303(a) of the Act makes it unlawful "for any labor organization to
engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section
158(b)(4)." Taft-Hartley Act § 303(a), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1982). The offending
labor organization is liable for damages to a person injured in his business or property by reason of such a violation. Id. § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1982). Section
158(b)(4), referred to in § 303(a), is the labor statute that prohibits unions from
using secondary boycotts and other coercive tactics to achieve their goals. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). Thus, the right to recover damages under § 303 is based
upon conduct unlawful under § 158(b)(4). Pertinent to this discussion are the following parts of § 158(b)(4):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its

agents (4)(i) . . . to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person . . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment . . . to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . . where . . .

an object thereof is (A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to join any . . . em-

ployer organization . . .
(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business

with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees.
Id.
Section 158(b)(4) restricts union objectives and tactics and seeks thereby to
curb abuses of union power. This provision makes it unlawful for a union to encourage employees to strike or otherwise refuse to perform services for their employer where the union's objective is one declared unlawful in the statute. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982); see NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 52-54 (1964).
The union objectives declared unlawful, as set forth in subsections (A) through (D)
of § 158(b)(4), include secondary boycotts and similar coercive efforts to force an
employer to recognize and bargain with a particular labor union. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(A)-(D) (1982).
327 For example, these sections are directed at conduct against secondary persons, not the primary employers. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 620 (1967). Other limitations bar liability where the union's conduct
"will directly benefit employees" and seeks to protect the wages and job opportunities of the employees under the union's contract with the primary employer. See,
e.g., Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538
(D.C. Cir. 1964). But see Union de Tronquistas v. Arlook, 586 F.2d 872, 874-75 (1 st
Cir. 1978) (example of conduct illegal under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)); Local 644,
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1136, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (same);
NLRB v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (!973).
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demonstrate the following facts: (a) their conduct was in direct
reaction to union pressure and coercion; (b) they acted in good
faith; (c) they did not have reasonable and practical alternatives
to accession to the union's demands; and (d) they themselves did
not profit from their accession to the union. If employers make
such a showing, they should be absolved from monetary liability
even though the conduct is an agreement, combination, or conspiracy. The offending union, however, would still face the possibility of a damage judgment for its illegal antitrust conduct. As
with the Conex defense, this suggested employer defense would
apply only to treble damage claims under section 4 of the Clayton Act; it would not bar the entry of an injunction under section
16 of the Clayton Act. Qualifying the defense in this way would
strike the proper balance between good faith, reluctant employer
conduct and conscious, willful employer conduct in violation of
the antitrust laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

The labor exemption from antitrust liability is an important
protection for employers acting in good faith. Unfortunately, the
standards fixed in the case law have not had a linear development, and they are too often vaguely and confusingly worded.
The type of qualified defense recommended by Conex achieves a
sensible balance between excusable and inexcusable employer
conduct. This article has attempted to suggest similar pragmatic
tests for other aspects of labor-related antitrust cases. The standards it discusses should also assist employers in evaluating the
consequences of their labor-related conduct by making the
proper tests more easily understood and, therefore, enabling
more accurate prediction of the antitrust implications of that
conduct.

